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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
Stanton D. Krauss*
I ought to be very angry with my friend Akhil Amar. His
new book, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction,'
strengthens, develops, and popularizes his strikingly original
claim that the meaning of our Bill of Rights must be sought in
the understanding of the people who enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than that of James Madison and his contemporaries.2 If Akhil carries the day on this question-and I
find his arguments quite powerful-,my ongoing research into
the original meaning of the Bill will be of interest only to antiquarians.
So why aren't I furious with him? For one thing, this elegantly written book was fun to read. Moreover, it's packed with
brilliant insights into our constitutional history. Most importantly, however, it has provoked me to think in different ways
and about different aspects of the original meaning of the Bill
of Rights than is my wont. And it has helped me achieve a
deeper understanding of a subject that I study and teach, and
about which I care.
The Bill of Rights had this effect on me because there's more
to it than its analysis of the current relevance of how the Bill's
Creators understood their work. Drawing heavily upon other
scholars' studies of individual parts of the Creators' Bill, the
book contends that we wrongly attribute a minority-protective,
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College. BA., 1975, Yale University; J.D., 1978,
University of Michigan. I would like to thank Neil Cogan and Stephen Gilles for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to blame
them for any remaining errors, but they're all my fault.
1. AKiHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
2. This book builds upon his earlier work, especially Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (1996), The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992), and The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
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individual rights oriented, view of the Bill to its Creators, when
we actually owe that vision to its Reconstructors. The original
Bill of Rights, it insists, was far more structural and
majoritarian in nature than is popularly thought. To correct
this misunderstanding, much of The Bill of Rights is devoted to
a discussion of the structural and majoritarian aspects of each
provision of the first ten amendments.
It is that discussion which has proven so helpful to me. In
the pages that follow, I express my gratitude to Akhil by giving
him something that we both enjoy: an argument. As is only
fitting, the argument in this paper concerns something the book
says about the original understanding of the Bill of Rights.
More appropriately still, it's about a topic The Bill of Rights
has challenged me to consider anew: the Jury Trial Clause of
the Seventh Amendment.
This clause's text--In Suits at common law ...

the right of

preserved" 3 -is

puzzling. The interpretive
trial by jury shall be
problem posed by this language is simple: given that there were
no preexisting federal courts when it was written, and thus no
preexisting right to jury trial in those courts to "preserve," and
given further that the scope of both the common-law courts'
jurisdiction and the right to a civil jury trial were defined differently in different states, what did the Creators of this Clause
have in mind?
Though acknowledging that the question is "not free from
doubt," The Bill of Rights asserts that "the best reading of the
[Jury Trial Clause] is probably as follows: if a state court entertaining a given common-law case would use a civil jury, a federal court hearing

the same case

. . .

must follow-must

'preserve'--that state-law jury right."4 Furthermore, the forum
state's law is to determine what constitutes a "common-law
case" for these purposes.5 Thus, the book reads the Jury Trial
Clause as a federalism-based delegation to the states of the
prerogative of determining the minimum scope of the right to
jury trial in the federal civil courts.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4. AMAR, supra note 1, at 89.
5. See id.
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The Supreme Court thinks that the Creators had something
very different in mind when they adopted this Clause. According to the Court, their intent was to "preserve" the right of jury
trial "which existed under the English common law when the
amendment was adopted."' The Court has taken this to mean
that there can be no right to jury trial under this Clause unless
"we are dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at
law at the time of the Founding or is at least analogous to one
that was."7
I have come to the conclusion that The Bill of Rights' "original understanding" of the Jury Trial Clause is wrong. And I've
reached the same conclusion about the Supreme Court's vision
of what the Creators of this Clause were trying to accomplish,
and the resulting constitutional doctrine that so few academics
seem to like.8 Before the end of this essay, I hope to have persuaded you that I'm right about these things, and that this
provision was actually meant to allow the Congress to decide
which cases should be triable to juries in the new federal
courts.
I will not, however, begin this effort immediately. First, it
will be helpful for me to say something about the circumstances
that led James Madison to propose our Seventh Amendment.
Next, I will set forth the reasons why I find The Bill of Rights'

6. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (quoting
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)).
7. Id. Markman added, however, that the Court's "formulations of the historical
test do not deal with the possibility of conflict between actual English common law
practice and American assumptions about what that practice was, or between English
and American practices at the relevant time." Id. at 376 n.3.
The Clause also governs the determination of questions beyond whether a party
is entitled to a jury trial of a particular claim, including the right to jury trial with
respect to mixed claims in a unified judicial system and which issues must be left to
a jury in a "suit at common law." For a survey of modern decisions, see CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTS 649-62 (5th ed. 1994).

8. For a sampling of this doctrine's unfavorable press, see, for example, Paul D.
Carrington, The Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
33 (1990); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005 (1992); Martin Redish, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision
Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 486 (1975); Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on
How You Draw the Lines":"An Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599 (1996); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History
of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639 (1973).
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account of the original meaning of the Jury Trial Clause unsatisfactory. I will then explain why I believe the Supreme Court's
view (and thus current doctrine) to be in error. Finally, I will
present the case for what I deem the best account of the original understanding of the Jury Trial Clause.
I. WHY WE HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ABOUT
CIVIL JURY TRIALS
All summer long, no one said one word at the Constitutional
Convention about a right to civil jury trial.9 Until the final
week, that is. On September 12, after the Committee on Style
and Arrangement presented its report and the Convention decided to modify its provision concerning the congressional override of presidential vetoes," Hugh Williamson, seemingly out
of the blue, "observed to the House that no provision was yet
made for juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of
it."" The following colloquy ensued:
Mr. Gorham. It is not possible to discriminate equity
cases from those in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be safely trusted in this matter.
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst.
corrupt Judges. He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed to provide a clause for securing
the trial by Juries.
Col: Mason perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr.
Gorham. The jury cases cannot be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some other points would be
sufficient. He wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill
of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the purpose. It would give great quiet to the people; and with the
aid of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a
few hours.

9. The Convention convened on May 25, 1787, and met regularly through July
26. A week-long recess ensued, during which the Committee on Detail prepared a
draft Constitution. The Convention reconvened on August 6 and remained in session
until September 17, when the delegates endorsed the Constitution and adjourned. See
Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289, 292-93 (1966).
10. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 616-30 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1987).
11. Id. at 630.
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Mr. Gerry concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights. Col: Mason 2ded the motion.
Mr. Sherman, was for securing the rights of the people
where requisite. The State Declarations of Rights are not
repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are sufficient. There are many cases where juries are proper which
cannot be discriminated. The Legislature may be safely
trusted.
Col: Mason. The Laws of the U. S. are to be paramount
to State Bills of Rights.
On the question for a Come. to prepare a Bill of Rights
N.H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. no. N.J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md.
no. Va. no. N.C. no. S.C. no. Geo. no. 2
On September 15, two days before the Convention adjourned,
the matter came up again:
Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. Mr. Pinckney & Mr. Gerry
moved to annex to the end, "And a trial by jury shall be
preserved as usual in civil cases."
Mr. Gorham. The constitution of Juries is different in
different States, and the trial itself is usual in different
cases in different states.
Mr. King urged the same objections[.]
Genl. Pinckney also. He thought such a clause in the Constitution would be pregnant with embarrassments.
13
The motion was disagreed to, nem: con:
The Convention's failure to create a constitutional right to
civil jury trials was part of an even larger political blunder: its
refusal to heed George Mason's eleventh-hour request to add a
Bill of Rights to the proposed Constitution.'4 The Antifederalists made the most of the lack of such a Bill in their campaign
to prevent ratification of the Constitution, and they almost succeeded as a result. 5 The absence of a guarantee that litigants
would have a right to jury trial in civil cases in any new feder-

12. Id.
13. Id. at 647-48.
14. Charles Pinkney's proposal of August 20 had sought the inclusion of freedom
of the press and quartering clauses, see id. at 485-86, but the Convention rejected
these requests, as well.
15. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS ix (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
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al courts contributed to what may have been their most potent
arguments against the proposed Constitution."6 Citing Article
III's mandate that "[t]he trial of all Crimes... shall be by
Jury"'7 and its declaration that the Supreme Court's "appellate
Jurisdiction" would encompass both "Law and Fact," 8 the
Antifederalists charged that this omission was part of a Federalist conspiracy against civil juries, which had silently been
banished from the federal courts. What's more, in the exercise
of their appellate jurisdiction, the new Supreme Court justices
would be able to gat the authority of state court juries by redetermining "Law and Fact."' 9 Not even King George had been
so boldly tyrannical!
Here, as elsewhere, the Federalists proclaimed their good
intentions, but to no avail.2" Only by promising amendments
did the Federalists prevail, and only by promising to support
amendments did men like James Madison win election to the
First Congress. But even then, the Antifederalists' cause was
not necessarily lost. North Carolina and Rhode Island had refused to ratify, and Virginia and New York called for a new
convention a month after Congress convened. To stem the tide,
Madison felt he had to move fast. So he raised the subject of
amendments the day before Virginia's petition was presented to
the House and then goaded his Federalist colleagues until,
almost five months later, twelve amendments were sent to the
States for ratification. Ten of these became our Bill of Rights.
The seventh article of our Bill was the Federalists' ultimate

16. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 16,750). The reasons for the Antifederalists' preference for civil juries are explored, for example, in Wolfram, supra note 8, at 670-705, and Alan Howard
Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment,
and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148-56 (1991). The Antifederalists' arguments, along with the Federalists' responses, are collected in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,

DEBATES, SOURCES,

AND

ORIGINS 521-96

(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
18. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
19. The fact that the Court's appellate jurisdiction was not limited to civil cases,
along with the lack of a guarantee that federal criminal juries would be drawn from
the vicinage of the crime, were cited by the Antifederalists as demonstrating that the
Constitution threatened the right to jury trial in criminal, as well as civil cases. See,
e.g., Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 419-77.
20. On the events recounted in this paragraph, see Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at ix-xvii, 57.
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constitutional response to the Antifederalists' concerns about
civil juries.
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS' SOLUTION TO THE RIDDLE OF THE
JURY TRIAL CLAUSE

Undaunted by the fact that no one seems ever to have endorsed its vision of the original meaning of the Jury Trial
Clause before now, The Bill of Rights claims that it has "considerable historical support.""' And what evidence supports
this claim? First, the book cites statements by a number of
"commentators in 1788, both Federalist and Anti-, suggest[ing]
that dynamic conformity with state jury rules would make good
sense." ' Second, it notes that a passage in The Federalist Papers shows that several state ratifying conventions proposed
civil jury trial guarantees intended to require the federal courts
to allow civil jury trials when they would be available in the
forum state's courts.' Third, it argues that this reading of the
Jury Trial Clause would fit nicely with the Antifederalists'
confidence in the states as bulwarks against tyranny.'
None of this evidence shows that anyone who had actually
read or heard of James Madison's proposed civil jury guarantee

21. AMAR, supra note 1, at 89.
22. Id. at 90.
23. See id. at 89.
24. See id. at 92. The book also makes several other arguments in favor of his
theory. Two are textual in nature. First, it notes that the Jury Trial Clause was not
copied from any of its state counterparts and, unlike many of them, had no "backward-looking language." Id. The former observation is true, but proves nothing about
the correctness of a "dynamic conformity" interpretation of the Clause. Depending on
the meaning of word "preserved," the latter may or may not be true; if it is true,
this fact would support the "dynamic" component of the book's reading of the Clause,
but it wouldn't necessarily have any particular bearing on the "conformity" aspect
thereof. Second, The Bill of Rights attempts to connect "preserved" with the "dynamic
conformity" thesis by suggesting that its meaning here may be like that of "its etymological cousin, reserved, in the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 90. However, this argument overlooks the obvious fact that the Creators chose not to use the word "reserved" in the Jury Trial Clause. Finally, the book makes the theoretical point that
"tlhe centrality of state-law cases to the Seventh Amendment .. . explains why its
jury rules were keyed to state practice whereas the jury rules of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments-dealing overwhelmingly with suits under federal law [and "a Congress
bent on evading civil juries could draft statutes sounding in equity, not law"I--were
not." Id. at 92. I will address this point below, at note 147.
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or the Jury Trial Clause that grew out of it believed that either
required dynamic conformity with the rights existing in common-law cases tried in the forum state's courts. Most of it does
not actually support The Bill of Rights' thesis.' The rest I find
unpersuasive. In fact, when other data, not considered by The
Bill of Rights, is taken into account, I believe that the historical record points strongly away from its "original understanding" of the Clause.
One category of the book's "supporting evidence" consists of
two Antifederalists' complaints that the proposed Constitution
didn't guarantee the right to civil jury trial in the federal
courts. But on closer inspection, these men were demanding
something rather different than The Bill of Rights suggests. I
begin with the comment of Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina ratifying convention. The relevant portion of his remarks
reads as follows:
It has been said, in defence of the omission concerning the
trial by jury in civil cases, that one general regulation could
not be made; that in several cases the constitution of several states did not require a trial by jury,-for instance, in
cases of equity and admiralty,-whereas in others it did,
and that, therefore, it was proper to leave this subject at
large.... I think that the respectable body who formed the
Constitution...

might have provided that all those cases

which are now triable by a jury should be tried in each
state by a jury, according to the mode usually practiced in
such state.26
This passage does not demand that the federal courts allow
jury trials in what the forum state would deem common-law
cases. Rather, it insists upon conformity with state practice
even when that meant allowing jury trials in what the forum
state regarded as equity or admiralty cases. The same is true of
the cited complaint of the Antifederalist essayist who noted that
the Constitutional Convention could have "declared, that the
citizens of each state shall enjoy [the right of jury trial] con-

25. See AMAR, supra note 1, at xi-xv.
26. Remarks of Samuel Spencer, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28,
1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 523, 526.
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formably to the usage in the state where the tribunal shall be
established." '
The Bill of Rights also cites the comments of four Federalists
saying that federal civil jury trials might well be made available more or less in conformity to state practice." However,
none of these men said that the Constitution would or should
be amended to require incorporation of the relevant state law:
they simply predicted that Congress would more or less accomplish this statutorily. And none of them limited his prediction
to common-law cases.'
Finally, the book invokes The Federalist No. 83."o Alexander
Hamilton wasn't America's most enthusiastic admirer of civil
juries, but he wholeheartedly wanted his state (New York) to
ratify the Constitution, and he saw that this required a response to the Antifederalists' charge that it aimed to destroy
civil jury trials. This essay was part of his effort to meet that
challenge. After denying that the proposed Constitution forbid
the use of juries in civil cases tried in the federal courts, 3 '
Hamilton undertook to explain that no civil jury guarantee had

27. Essay by One of the Common People, reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 566, 567 (Dec. 3, 1787).
28. See Remarks of Christopher Gore, Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (Jan.
30, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 521, 521;
Remarks of Samuel Johnston, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 523, 525; Remarks
of Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 6, 1788), reprinted in
Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 537, 537-38; Oliver Ellsworth,
Landholder VI, in 14 THE DOCUMIENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CON-

STITUTION 401-02 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter
Kaminski, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The Bill of Rights also refers here to Roger
Sherman's comments at the Constitutional Convention, which are set forth above, in
the text accompanying note 12. Whatever those ambiguous remarks mean, their last
two sentences seem clearly to reject dynamic conformity, as a constitutional or statutory principle.
29. Oliver Ellsworth's essay comes the closest to embracing this limitation, saying
"[i]n chancery courts juries are never used, nor are they proper in admiralty
courts . . . ' Oliver Ellsworth, Landholder VI, in Kaminski, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,

supra note 28, at 401. Nonetheless, inasmuch as the preceding sentence states, "the
trials [may] be by jury also in most or all the causes which were wont to be tried by
them," id., the most that may be said is that the essay is hopelessly ambiguous on
this score.

30. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. See id. at 495-98.
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been included in the Constitution for a benign reason. The
reason that he gave was that the differing scope of the right to
jury trial in the states," coupled with state chauvinism, precluded agreement on the scope of any uniform federal standard,
and that deference to diverse state practices would have been

32. See id. at 502-06. Hamilton's survey of the thirteen state court systems is
worth quoting in full:
In this state [New York], our judicial establishments resemble, more
nearly than in any other, those of Great Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of probates (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual
courts in England), a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery. In the
courts of common law only, the trial by jury prevails, and this with some
exceptions. In all the others a single judge presides, and proceeds in
general either according to the course of the canon or civil law, without
the aid of a jury.* In New Jersey, there is a court of chancery which
proceeds like ours, but neither corts of admiralty nor of probates, in the
sense in which these last are established with us. In that State the
courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes which with us
are determinable in the courts of admiralty and of probates, and of
course the jury trial is more extensive in New Jersey than in New York.
In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still more the case, for there is no court
of chancery in that State, and its common-law courts have equity jurisdiction. It has a court of admiralty, but none of probates, at least on the
plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania.
Maryland approaches more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia,
except that the latter has a plurality of chancellors. North Carolina bears
most affinity to Pennsylvania; South Carolina to Virginia. I believe, however, that in some of those States which have distinct courts of admiralty, the causes depending in them are triable by juries. In Georgia there
are none but common-law courts, and an appeal of course lies from the
verdict of one jury to another, which is called a special jury, and for
which a particular mode of appointment is marked out. In Connecticut
they have no distinct courts, either of chancery or of admiralty, and their
courts of probates have no jurisdiction of causes. Their common-law
courts have admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction. In
cases of importance, their General Assembly is the only court of chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by jury extends in practice further than in any other State yet mentioned. Rhode Island is, I believe, in
this particular, pretty much in the situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law, equity, and
admiralty, jurisdictions are in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern
States, the trial by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation than
in the other States, but it is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its
full extent, to any of them. There is an appeal of course from one jury to
another, till there have been two verdicts out of three on one side.
* It has been erroneously insinuated, with regard to the court of chancery, that this court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The truth is
that references to a jury in that court rarely happen, and are in no case
necessary but where the validity of a devise of land comes into question.
Id. at 502-03.
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irrational, subversive of law, and (particularly with respect to
prize cases) a threat to national security.'
As the Antifederalists forcefully reminded the public,3
Hamilton's premises might have led to the conclusion that Congress would be equally unable to agree upon a statutory civil
jury trial right, and that there would be no such right in the
new federal courts. But Hamilton was emphatically not suggesting that this would happen. And why not? The reason, I suspect, is that Hamilton understood (and approved of the fact)
that Congress would be authorized to enact such civil jury trial
rules as a simple majority of the members of each House
deemed prudent from time to time.' Of course, he also understood that the resulting rules would leave some people disappointed. Hamilton didn't want to say anything about the latter
point during the ratification controversy, however, because his
goal was to promote ratification, not jeopardize it. As such, it
was prudent to ignore the prospect that a congressional majority might accept a uniform national standard, and to pretend
(without actually saying) that no state had proposed one.
To that end, Hamilton reviewed only the first two proposed
civil jury trial amendments, both of which (he claimed) were
meant to require federal courts to allow civil jury trials in
conformity with state practice. Having been stymied in their
state's convention, Pennsylvania's Antifederalist delegates issued a minority report and proposed amendments in December,
1787.' One of these proposals, building upon two provisions of
the Keystone State's Constitution, was, "That in controversies
respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial
by jury shall be as heretofore, as well in the federal courts, as
in those of the several states."3' While Hamilton reasonably

33. See id. at 504-09.
34. See, e.g., CINCINNATUS No. 3 (Nov. 15, 1787), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 563, 563-64.
35.
36. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
146-67 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
37. Pennsylvania Minority Proposal, Pennsylvania State Convention (Dec. 12,
1707), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
The relevant provisions of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution may be found in Cogan,
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 516.
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interpreted this proposal to require the incorporation of existing
state jury trial rights into federal law, 8 he noted that it did
not limit this mandate to what a Briton or a New Yorker would
have regarded as common-law cases. Quite the contrary, he
complained, it would obligate federal courts to let juries decide
what he deemed admiralty cases in Connecticut and equity cases in Pennsylvania. 9
Hamilton then turned to the amendment tendered by
Massachusetts' ratification convention. This submission looked
very different from the Pennsylvania minority's offering of several months earlier. It stated that [iun civil actions between
Citizens of different States every issue of fact arising in Actions
at common law shall be tried by a Jury if the parties or either
of them request it." 4" Despite its facial limitation to "Actions at
common law," which he defined as cases tried "in a court of
common law,"4 Hamilton argued that (with respect to diversity suits) this proposal meant the same thing as the Pennsylvania minority's-i.e., that since Pennsylvania's equity jurisdiction, unlike New York's, was lodged in common-law courts, the
federal courts in the former state, but not the latter, would be
bound to let a jury decide equity diversity cases.4 2 Thus, with
respect to diversity suits, Hamilton read this proposal as incorporating the forum state's view of what constitutes an "Action
at common law."
This comes much closer than any of the other evidence reviewed thus far to showing that somebody actually believed
that there should be a federal jury trial right of the type identified by The Bill of Rights. But was Hamilton's interpretation of
the Bay State proposal correct? Even if it was, what would that
imply with respect to the meaning of our Jury Trial Clause?
I begin with the former question. The Pennsylvania
Antifederalists' formulation had been widely circulated for
months, yet the Massachusetts convention chose not to endorse

38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 503-04.
39. See id.
40. Massachusetts Proposal, Massachusetts State Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506-07.
42. See id. On the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania and New York courts of common
law, see supra note 32.
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it. Nor did they craft a proposal that said, for example, "In civil
actions between Citizens of different States every issue of fact
arising in Actions triable by jury in the common law courts of
each State, respectively, shall be tried by a Jury if the parties
or either of them request it."43 Instead, the Bay Staters wrote
a different proposal, one which limited the civil jury trial right
to diversity "Actions at common law" and deleted the Keystone
Staters' references to prior practice and the state courts. Presumably, they did so for a reason.
That reason would not have been the narrow chauvinism
noted by Hamilton. The text of this amendment was not derived from the jury trial guarantee in Massachusetts' Constitution, and it provided for jury trial in a much narrower class of
cases--diversity cases rather than "all controversies concerning
property, and... suits between two or more persons, except in
cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practiced,

. . .

unless in causes arising on the high seas, and such

as relate to mariner's wages, the legislature shall thereafter
find it necessary to alter it."' As a result, if federal courts
and state courts were vested with concurrent jurisdiction over
cases involving ambassadors or federal questions, for example,
the convention's proposal would not have ensured that the parties would have the same jury trial rights in both sets of
courts.
In light of the fact that the historical record contains no
other explication of this proposal during the ratification debate,

43. The italicized words are modeled on the language of portions of the Judiciary
and Process Acts of 1789 that are quoted in the text accompanying notes 90 and 91,
below. The Maryland minority's criminal jury trial proposal stated "[t]hat there shall
be a trial by jury in all criminal cases, according to the course of proceeding in the
state where the offence is committed.' Maryland Minority Proposal, Maryland State
Convention (Apr. 26, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 16, at 401, 401. While the Massachusetts convention couldn't copy these as-yetunwritten texts, they prove that competent draftsmen of the time knew how to write
a clear state-law-incorporation rule. Indeed, two months before the Bay Staters wrote
their civil jury proposal, an essay in the Boston Gazette noted that the Constitutional
Convention could have "declared, that the citizens of each state shall enjoy [a right to
jury trial in civil cases] conformably to the usage in the state where the tribunal
shall be established.' Essay by One of the Common People, reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 566, 567 (Dec. 3, 1787).
44. MASS. CONST. (1780), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 16, at 509, 509-10.
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there is no reason to believe that he was relying on common
knowledge or private information. 45 Nor can the explanation be
that Antifederalist ideology required that the proposal be assumed to incorporate state jury practices, because the amendment proposed by the Maryland Antifederalists-the only extant
offering that Hamilton failed to mention in this essay-clearly
articulated a single, uniform, standard for determining the right
to civil jury trial in the federal courts.46 (Incidentally, that
standard was not the English standard enshrined in the State's
Constitution.4 ) Moreover, the Maryland minority's proposal

demonstrates the logical fallacy in inferring from the political
difficulty of persuading states to accept a non-conformity-based
rule that no proposal could have been meant to embody such a
standard. Indeed, with Hamilton's support, his home state
would shortly belie this assumption by endorsing a constitutional amendment guaranteeing federal litigants "the trial by Jury
in the extent that it obtains by the Common Law of England,"' which, coincidentally, seems to have described New
York's constitutional law and practice. 49 Massachusetts' amendment, too, could have contemplated a uniform standard for
determining the scope of a "common law" court's jurisdiction, be
it a single standard already in use in one or more states, a new
federal standard, or British practice.
So why did Hamilton read the Massachusetts proposal to
require conformity with state law, a position he dismissed in
this same essay as offensive to "every well-regulated judgment?" ° Although his failure even to mention the Maryland
minority's proposal shows that he was willing to shade the
truth in order to "win" a rhetorical argument about the virtue

45. Indeed, Hamilton strongly implied that he had no extrinsic evidence of the
meaning of this proposal. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 30, at 506.
46. See Maryland Minority Proposal, Maryland State Convention (Apr. 26, 1788),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 506, 506-07.
47. See Maryland: Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 508, 508.
48. New York Proposal, New York State Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in
Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
49. The civil jury provisions of New York's state constitution may be found in
Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 514, 514. On the similarity between the right to jury trial in civil cases in New York and England, see note 32,
supra.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 504.
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of the Founders' intentions without further inflaming anyone's
concerns about the future federal right to jury trial in civil
cases, I believe that Hamilton had a non-tactical reason to
interpret the Massachusetts amendment as he did: his interpretation was faithful to the intent of its creators. In my view, the
key to understanding this provision lies in its restriction to
diversity cases. This limitation seems to me to be linked to, and
to shed light on, the proposal's confinement of the right to jury
trial to "Actions at common law."
What's the connection? I believe that the Bay State's
amendment was designed to ensure that the creation of a new
federal forum for litigating disputes arising under state law
would not unjustifiably deprive Americans of a right to jury
trial that they otherwise would have had in the state courts.5
That is, Massachusetts recognized a legitimate federal interest
in deciding who would find the facts in suits under federal or
international law,5 and in actions (such as contract or tort
suits involving foreigners) in which state law might apply but
predominating federal concerns like international relations
could justify overriding state policy. In the absence of such
considerations, however, this proposal required that the federal
courts respect the forum state's desire to allow the parties to
civil litigation to submit their case to a jury. Although this
analysis could offer no better explanation than careless drafting

51. This is not the same as a principle that the sovereign whose substantive law
governs a case should also determine the litigants' right to trial by jury. (The Bill of
Rights suggests that the Jury Trial Clause embodies this principle. See AMAR, supra
note 1, at 91-92.) On the one hand, in the absence of a federal law or treaty, state
law might govern tort suits brought against Americans by foreign ambassadors, but
the proposal didn't ensure a right to jury trial in these cases. On the other hand, I
doubt that the authors of this provision believed that, in an "equity" suit filed (say)
in New York by a New Yorker against a visiting Bostonian, if Massachusetts' substantive law governed the dispute, the New York courts would have had to allow a
jury trial whenever the Massachusetts courts would, or that, were the situation reversed, Massachusetts' courts would have been bound to try the case without a jury
whenever New York's would. (If the dispute involved property, for example, a refusal
to allow a jury trial in the latter situation would seem clearly to have violated the
state's Constitution, which is excerpted in the text accompanying note 44, above.)
52. Even Thomas Jefferson favored denying a right to jury trial in admiralty cases. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in
Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 592, 592; see also Letter from

Thomas Jefferson to Uriah Forrest (Dec. 31, 1787), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 593, 593.
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for the provision's apparent distinction between states in which
equity claims were tried in the common-law courts and those in
which they were tried to a jury in chancery, it would explain
both the limitation of the proposed right to diversity cases and
the proposal's insistence upon conformity to the forum state's
rules on the availability of jury trial in those cases.'
As far as the surviving historical record shows, no one else
said one word about the meaning of this amendment during the
ratification controversy. This silence doubtless reflects three
things. First, the incompleteness of our information. Thus,
while New Hampshire endorsed this proposal," there are virtually no surviving records of what was said at the New Hampshire convention,55 so if anyone said anything there to clarify
its meaning, we don't know about it. Second, by the time The
FederalistNo. 83 appeared in print, the newspaper controversy
over the Constitution was winding down, and it had all but
ended in New England, where Massachusetts and Connecticut
had ratified and Rhode Island's leaders refused to convene a
ratifying convention. 6 Third, as the following account makes
clear, the Bay State's civil jury proposal had little apparent
impact on the states that had yet to ratify the Constitution. To
the best of my knowledge, no one outside of Massachusetts'
former appendage and (with respect to political and constitu-

53. It would also suggest that Hamilton's comments about the "diversity" limitation, see THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506, were disingenuous.
54. See New Hampshire Proposal, New Hampshire State Convention (June 21,
1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
55. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1, 21 (1986).
56. The status of the ratification process on May 28, 1788, when The Federalist
No. 83 was printed, can be ascertained by examining the table found in DANIEL A
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 216 (1990).
A perusal of the Table of Contents of Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
16, indicates the paucity of commentary published nationally after that date. And the
relevant volume of Herbert Storing's collection of Antifederalist literature includes no
subsequent essays written in New England. See 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
(Herbert Storing ed., 1981).
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tional issues) current satellite, New Hampshire," so much as
mentioned it during the rest of the ratification debate.
In any event, it left no mark on the text of the proposed civil
jury guarantee of any state other than New Hampshire. Three
other ratifying states (along with North Carolina, which refused
to ratify the Constitution) recommended civil jury trial amendments before the first twelve congressionally approved amendments were transmitted to the states for ratification. As noted
above," Maryland's minority had proposed an explicitly uniform jury trial guarantee prior to the publication of The Federalist No. 83. Virginia's ratification followed New Hampshire's,
and its civil jury trial proposal was an almost verbatim reiteration of the portion of its Declaration of Rights that had found
its way into Pennsylvania's Constitution,5 9 and from thence
into the Pennsylvania Antifederalists' offering. This tendered
amendment (which was also endorsed by North Carolinas)
read "W[t]hat in controversies respecting property, and in suits
between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is one of the
greatest Securities to the rights of the people, and ought to
remain sacred and inviolable."6 Finally, New York, in which
"the boundaries between actions at common law and actions of
57. With respect to New Hampshire's one-time union with Massachusetts, see
JERE R. DANIELL, COLONIAL NEW HAMPsHnI--A HISTORY 39-79 (1981). The politi-

cal/constitutional influence the Bay State wielded over its smaller neighbor in 1788
can be gauged by comparing their respective constitutions of 1780 and 1784. Compare
MASS. CONST. (1780), reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1888-

1911 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909), with N.H. CONST. (1784), reprinted in 4 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2453-70 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). For

a comparison of the constitutional amendments proposed by the respective ratifying
conventions, see Massachusetts Proposal, Massachusetts State Convention (June 8,
1789), reprinted in Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 14, 14;
New Hampshire Proposal, New Hampshire State Convention (June 21, 1788), reprinted in Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 16, 16.

58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. See Virginia: Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 517, 517; Pennsylvania: Declaration of Rights art. XI,
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 515, 516.
60. See North Carolina Proposal, North Carolina State Convention (Aug. 1, 1788),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
61. Virginia Proposal, Virginia State Convention (June 27, 1988), reprinted in
Cogan, CoMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 508, 508. This praiseful admonition calls to mind the request made at the Constitutional Convention by George Mason, the author of Virginia's Declaration of Rights, see Wolfram, supra note 8, at 667,
for "[a] general principle laid down on" the right to jury trial, which may be found in
the text accompanying note 12, above.
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equitable jurisdiction [were] ascertained in conformity to the
rules which prevail[ed] in England,"6 2 recommended the adoption of the following provision: "That the trial by Jury in the
extent that it obtains by the Common Law of England is one of
the greatest securities to the rights of a free People, and ought
to remain inviolate."'
Two months before the scheduled opening of the First Congress, an anonymous writer broke this silence. The Foreign
Spectator, who wrote twenty-eight essays on the amendments
proposed by the various states,6 devoted most of his twentieth
number to a discussion of the first three tendered civil jury
proposals. 65 Like Hamilton, The Spectator argued that the extent of any jury trial guarantee must be the same in federal
courts throughout the Nation and condemned the proposals that
he reviewed. 6 Unlike Hamilton, he purported to be unsure as
to whether the Pennsylvania minority's proposal had been
meant to mandate conformity to the forum state's civil jury
trial right or to Pennsylvania's. However, I believe he agreed
with Hamilton that the Massachusetts amendment's reference
to "Actions at common law" lefi the definition of "that species of
causes"6 7 to state law.6
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506.
63. New York Proposal, New York State Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in
Cogan, CoMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507. Unfortunately, we
don't know whether this provision spoke of "the Common Law of England" rather
than "at Common Law" in order to clarify a perceived ambiguity in Massachusetts'
proposal, to signify a different standard, or for some other reason.
64. See Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at xiv.
65. See Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution proposed by the
Conventions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Virginia, South and North
Carolina with the Minorities of Pennsylvania and Maryland by a Foreign Spectator,
Number XX, FED. GAZETTE, AND PHILA. EVE. POST, Jan. 6, 1789, at 2 [hereinafter
The Spectator]. The Spectator didn't discuss the Virginia/North Carolina jury trial
proposal, but this seems to have been because their other amendments (which he did
mention) would have virtually eliminated the federal courts' non-admiralty original
jurisdiction. He said nothing at all about New York's proposal, from which I infer
that he favored it. Perhaps, as a "Foreigner," he was reluctant to endorse a suggestion explicitly to incorporate "foreign" law into the Constitution. Maybe this would
even have been true if the "Foreigner" was actually an American Hamiltonian, or
Hamilton himself. Cf. infra text accompanying note 156.
66. Like Hamilton, he didn't review them all. See supra note 65; text accompanying note 46.
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506.
68. The Spectator's interpretation of this proposal is itself vague:
The different boundaries of equity jurisdiction would render this clause
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But even if we assume that Massachusetts (and New Hampshire), like the Pennsylvania minority, sought some kind of
conformity-based civil jury guarantee, and read New York's as a
request to "preserve" New York's civil jury-trial rights in the
federal courts sitting in that state-even if we assume further
that the Antifederalists in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina secretly longed for this also-we can't take it for granted
that their quest succeeded. A parallel Antifederalist failure
illustrates the point perfectly.
Although The Bill of Rights doesn't dwell on it, 9 even with
Madison's help, the Antifederalists didn't get a dearly-wanted
constitutional guarantee that federal criminal juries would be
drawn from the vicinity of the crime.7" A House-passed proposal provided for the right to "an Impartial Jury of the Vicinage"
ambiguous. The same causes might, as matters of equity, be referred to
the court of chancery in one state, and in another be deemed actions at
common law, because determinable in a court at common law which has
the usual powers of a court of chancery. Besides, this eventual introduction of juries, in cases of equity, would not be proper, nor generally
agreeable.
The Spectator, supra note 65, at 2. I believe that his use of the word "ambiguous" in
this passage was meant to parallel Hamilton's comment, about the same language,
that "there are no expressions more vague and indeterminate than ['Actions at common law'] to characterize that species of causes which it is intended shall be entitled
to a trial by jury." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506.
69. In fact, the book devotes very little attention-about a page and a half-to
the Creators' District Clause, principally pointing out that it differs from Article uIrs
Jury Trial Clause (a structural requirement that crimes be tried by jury within the
state where they occurred) by giving defendants a waivable right to a jury from the
district where the crime occurred. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 104-08. On the one
hand, thats far more than the parenthetical comparison to the Double Jeopardy
Clause that is The Bill of Rights' entire discussion of the Reexamination Clause of
the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 96. But on the other hand, it's equally reflective
of the fact that the chapter on juries is far more focused on the Founders' view of
juries than on the waivable jury-related rights they gave criminal defendants and
civil litigants in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.
70. The leading study of the American law of vicinage is Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 801 (1976) [hereinafter Kershen I];30 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(1977). The Antifederalists' insistence upon a guarantee of local criminal juries is
discussed in Kershen I, at 816-17, 833-44. The story of Madison's fight to secure such
a guarantee is recounted in Kershen I at 818-28. It should be noted, however, that
Kershen was misled by Edward Dumbauld about one fact: the District Clause was
adopted by the Conference Committee and included in its Report of September 24,
1789, which also incorporated Madison's criminal jury trial amendment into another
article concerning the rights of criminal defendants. Compare id. at 825-28, 856-57
with Conference Committee Report (Sept. 24, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, supra note
16, at 396-97.
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in criminal cases, 71 yet the Senate refused to accept the "local"
aspect of this jury right, 7' and Madison was unable to persuade the Senate Conferees to yield on the matter. The best he
could get was the District Clause, which stipulates that, if
Congress chose to create judicial districts within any state, a
defendant charged with committing a crime within that state
could insist that the jury come from "the .

. .

district wherein

the crime shall have been committed."7'
In a letter to Edmund Pendleton, Madison explained the
problem in this manner:
In many of the States juries even in criminal cases are
taken from the State at large-in others from districts of
conside[rable] extent-in very few from the County alone.
Hence a [disilike to the restraint with respect to vicinage,
which has produced a negative on that clause.... The
difficulty of uniting the minds of men accustomed to think
and act differently can only be conceived by those who have
witnessed it. 4
He returned to this subject nine days later in another, slightly
more revealing, letter to Pendleton:
[The Senate] are . . . inflexible in opposing a definition of

the locality of Juries. The vicinage they contend is either
too vague or too strict a term: too vague if depending on
limits to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if
limited to the County. It was proposed to insert after the
word juries--'with the accustomed requisites'-leaving the
definition to be construed according to the judgment of
professional men. Even this could not be obtained. The
truth is that in most of the States the practice is different,
and hence the irreconcilable difference of ideas on the subject. In some States, jurors are drawn from the whole body
71. House Resolution, Article the Tenth (Aug. 24, 1979), reprinted in, Cogan,
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 391, 391.

72. See Further Senate Consideration (Sept. 9, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 394, 394-95.

73. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In full, this provision reads, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been ascertained by law..

.

."

Id.

74. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted
in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 480, 480.
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of the community indiscrim[in]ately; In others, from large
districts comprehending a number of Counties; and in a few
only from a single County.75

So the Senators also wanted local juries, but each preferred

conformity with his own state's vicinage rule. Madison desperately wanted to broker a deal in order to pacify the Antifederalists (and maybe he also thought local juries are best), but he
couldn't. As a result, the -Sixth Amendment left the federal
government free to try a man in Richmond, before a jury of
Richmonders, for a crime committed in Kentucky (then part of
Virginia), which was precisely what the Antifederalists had demanded the Constitution be amended to forbid. 6
The obvious question about this story, from the perspective of
the present inquiry, is why the Conferees didn't quickly and
painlessly resolve their problem by adopting a provision requiring a federal court to follow the vicinage rule used in the forum
state's courts. Why didn't anyone in Congress (apparently) even
propose this approach, which had been suggested by the
Antifederalist minority at the Maryland ratifying convention?"

75. Letter from James Madison to Edmond Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), reprinted
in Cogan, COMPLEE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 480, 480-81.
76. For Antifederalist concerns that this hypothetical case might occur under the
unamended Constitution, see, for example, Remarks of John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1780), reprinted in Cogan, COIPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 16, at 432, 439-42; CENTINEL No. 2 (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in Cogan,
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 449, 450; BRUTUS No. 2 (Nov. 1, 1787),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 451, 451-52.
The District Clause did not preclude this possibility because it didn't require
that Congress create districts smaller than a State. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Accordingly, the Clause gave defendants nothing they would not have already gotten
under Article III. See Kershen I, supra note 70, at 857. Therefore, although "the
concept of vicinage was given constitutional status" by the District Clause, see id., I
cannot agree with Kershen or The Bill of Rights that it was a symbolic victory for
the Antifederalists, or a compromise. See id. at 827, 857-58; AMAR, supra note 1, at
106. It was a fig leaf covering a surrender, and the Antifederalists lost. Happily,
though, as the Senate hoped, see Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton
(Sept. 23, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at
480, 481, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did quiet the Antifederalists' fears, see Kershen I,
supra note 70, at 858-60. (Here, too, Kershen errs in one respect: the Judiciary Act
made Kentucky and Maine separate judicial districts, which spoke directly to the
hypothetical case mentioned in the text. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1
Stat. 73.)
77. Their proposal provided "[t]hat there shall be a trial by jury in all criminal
cases, according to the course of proceeding in the state where the offence is commit-
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Why didn't Madison, whose civil Jury Trial Clause was allegedly conformity-based?
The simplest explanation for all of this-and the best-is
that, as much as the Federalist Senators on the Conference
Committee may have wanted their state courts' vicinage rules
to apply to federal courts sitting in their states, they abhorred
the idea of constitutionally compelled conformity even more.
Moreover, like Hamilton, the Foreign Spectator, James Wilson
and James Iredell, they felt the same way about constitutionally mandated incorporation of state civil jury trial rights. 8 And
so did the House Conferees, including James Madison.7 9
An examination of the legislative history and text of our
Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Clause supports the notion that
it wasn't meant*to incorporate state practice. Madison's initial
proposal to the House provided that "[i]n suits at common law,
between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best
securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate."' This proposition was largely, but not entirely, borrowed
from Virginia's proffered amendment.8 However, the critical
language, for present purposes, was inserted by Madison, who
added the words "at common law." Perhaps Madison had in
mind The Federalist No. 83's discussion of Massachusetts' tendered amendment and meant by these words to signify that the
forum state's definition of common-law jurisdiction was to obtain in a federal court. But this is neither the only, nor the

ted." Maryland Minority Proposal, Maryland State Convention (Apr. 26, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 401, 401.
78. Wilson and Iredell's opposition to a conformity-based civil jury trial rule is
noted in AMAR, supra note 1, at 90, n.*.
79. The latter portion of the comments that House Conferee Roger Sherman made
about civil juries at the Constitutional Convention indicate that he, too, would have
opposed an incorporation-based right to jury trial in civil cases. See supra text accompanying note 12.
80. Proposal by Madison in House (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 493, 493.
81. That amendment is set forth above, in the text accompanying note 61. Virginia based its ode to juries on the New York convention's, which may be found
above, in the text accompanying note 63. Madison, who had been a member of the
committee that wrote the Virginia proposal, see Thomas B. McAffee, The Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1235-36 (1990), returned
to New York's amendment when drafting his own, now substituting its "inviolate" for
Virginia's "sacred and inviolable."
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most likely, possibility. For one thing, Madison didn't limit the
jury trial right to diversity suits. Nor did his proposal use the
phrase "Actions at common law." While it did refer to "common
law," so did New York's requested guarantee, which Madison
had read,82 and which was (1) not limited to diversity suits
and (2) definitely not about dynamic conformity. More importantly, this language would have been familiar to Madison, or
any other gentleman, and connected in their minds with the
right to civil jury trial, which had traditionally been universally
recognized in the common-law courts. Thus, if he was thinking
about Hamilton's essay when he wrote his civil jury trial
amendment, Madison might have had in mind its definition of
"Actions at common law" as those "tried in a court of common
law."' Even if he remembered Hamilton's interpretation of the
Bay State's proposal, Madison might have disagreed with it or
felt that others might find the meaning of this language unclear, removed as it was from the context of that proposal. Otherwise, if Madison wished to follow in Massachusetts' footsteps,
why didn't he use the phrase "Actions at common law"? If he
wanted to use his own words to constitutionalize a civil jury
trial right based on the principle of dynamic conformity to the
forum State's law (and why would he have wanted to do so
here, but not in defining a vicinage requirement for criminal
juries?), why wouldn't he have expressed his intent less obscurely? Why, for example, wouldn't he have taken a lesson
from the Maryland minority's vicinage proposal, which read,
"That there shall be a trial by jury in all criminal cases, according to the course of proceeding in the state where the offence
is committed"?'
Whatever Madison's private understanding of his proposal,
the Jury Trial Clause only became part of the Bill of Rights by
82. See Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1789), reprinted in

Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTs, supra note 15, at 247, 247.
83. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 506-07.
84. Maryland Minority Proposal, Maryland State Convention (Apr. 26, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 401, 401 (emphasis
added). Note that another Madison proposal, which ultimately became the Reexamination Clause, referred to facts "triable by jury, according to the course of common
law." Proposal by Madison in House (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 493, 493. The differences between this language
and the Jury Trial Clause's "Suits at common law" will be considered below, in the

text accompanying notes 171-204.
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passing both Houses of Congress. There is no evidence that
anyone else in either House understood it to require dynamic
conformity with state jury practice.' And it isn't clear why
any other member of Congress would have supported that type
of civil jury clause when he wouldn't support a similar criminal
jury vicinage provision. Further, if the Congress did intend to
satisfy a popular demand for an incorporation-based civil jury
right, why wouldn't it have revealed this fact to the people
more clearly than through Madison's opaque language? After
all, each House did modify Madison's text. The House Committee of Eleven, of which Madison was a member, broadened and
edited it to read, "In suits at common law, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved."' Subsequently, the Senate added,
and then modified, an amount-in-controversy requirement."
But no one seems ever to have tried to make a dynamic conformity principle more explicit.
This point is particularly striking given the fact that the
First Congress contemporaneously used plain language to incor-

85. The only known remark that might even arguably reflect a Member of
Congress' pre-passage interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause was made by Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire on June 8, 1789, the day Madison first
read his proposals to the House. (Indeed, the Congressional Register's notes of this
session suggest that Livermore's comment was made shortly after Madison finished
speaking.) Livermore is reported to have said that "[h]e could not agree to make jury
trials necessary on every occasion; they were not practiced even at this time, and
there were some cases in which a cause could be better decided without a jury than
with one." Debate in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Veit,
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 69, 92. Assuming that this is an
accurate account of Livermore's statement, but see Hutson, supra note 55, at 38, and
that he correctly understood Madison's civil jury proposal in the first place, it's not
clear what we should make of this evidence. The crux of the problem is that it's
hard to see how Livermore could have construed the proposed amendment to require
jury trials "on every occasion." That "they were not practiced even at this time"
might suggest that he understood it to be altering state practice. Alternatively, he
could have believed that Madison sought to require conformity with state practice and
been objecting that the New England/Georgia practice of trying every case to a jury
was not "practiced . . . at this time" in every state, though this would have been an
odd objection for a New Englander to make. All in all, I'm inclined to believe that
this report is unreliable.
86. House Committee of Eleven Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 495, 495.
87. Further Senate Consideration (Sept. 7, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 499, 500-01.
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porate state rules in the Judiciary Act of 1789' and the Process Act.8 9 Thus, section 29 of the Judiciary Act provided that
Jurors in all cases to serve in the courts of the United
States shall be designated by lot or otherwise in each State
respectively according to the mode of forming juries therein
now practiced, so far as the laws of the same shall render
such designation practicable by the courts or marshals of
the United States; and the jurors shall have the same qualifications as are requisite for jurors by the laws of the State
of which they are citizens, to serve in the highest courts of
law of such State ... ."
Section 2 of the Process Act, which was enacted five days after
the Judiciary Act, read as follows:
[T]he forms of Writs and Executions except their Style; and
modes of Process and rates of fees, except fees to Judges, in
the Circuit and district Courts, in suits at common law,
shall be the same in each State respectively as are now
used or allowed in the supreme Courts of the same. And
the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity, and
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be according to
the course of the civil law; and the rates of fees the same
as are or were last allowed by the states respectively in the
court exercising supreme jurisdiction in such causes.9
As Wilfred Ritz observed, these statutes show that the First
Congress "had no difficulty" making it clear when they wanted
federal courts to "apply the law of a particular state."92 Moreover, the text of this particular provision was studied and altered in the House and the Senate. Under the circumstances, I
can't imagine why such a relatively obscure way of incorporating state law jury rights in the federal constitution would have
gone uncorrected, much less (as far as we know) unnoticed and
unchallenged, by any member of Congress.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
Process Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94.

92. WILFRED RIZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: ExPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 141 (Wythe Holt

& L.H. LaRue eds., 1990).
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In fact, I believe these Acts prove that the First Congress did
not mean the Jury Trial Clause to require that federal jury
trial rights conform with State practice. As Hamilton reminded
the public in The FederalistNo. 83, not all of the states limited
the right of jury trial to true "law" cases: some used juries in
admiralty cases tried in admiralty courts, and others did so by
trying what had traditionally been regarded as equity and admiralty cases in common-law courts.' The First Congress,
which included many lawyers and judges, as well as prominent
gentlemen familiar with the workings of their state courts, was
doubtless well aware of these variations in state practice.'
But the idea of deferring to state jury practice was plainly
rejected in the Judiciary Act. Thus, section 9 provided for exclusive federal district court jurisdiction over
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation or
trade of the United States, where the seizures are made, on
waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten
or more tons burthen, within their respective districts as
well as upon the high seas; ...

saving to suitors, in all

cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it;95
and expressly withheld from those cases a right to trial by
jury.' Thus, without regard to the prior practice in the state
courts, this type of case evidently would not be tried by juries
in the federal courts.97 Secondly, the Act withheld the right to
jury trial from equity cases, which section 16 differentiated
from "suits of a civil nature at common law""8 and "actions at

93. See supra note 32.
94. For some amusing evidence that Senators were well aware of other states'
equity practices, see The Diary of William Maclay, (July 1, 1789), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF

1789-1791, at 95-96, 109 (Charlene B. Bickford et al., 1972-) [hereinafter
DHFFC].
95. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
96. See id.
97. Nothing in the language of the statute would have prohibited a judge from
allowing trial by jury as a matter of grace, but I am unaware that this ever happened.
98. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. This provision gave federal
circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction over certain "suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity." Id. District courts had jurisdiction over some "Suits at common
AMERICA,
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law"" in this manner: "suits in equity shall not be sustained
in [the federal courts] ...
in any case where plain, adequate
and complete remedy may be had at law."' 0 While the last
eight quoted words from section 9 and the definition of equity
jurisdiction can be read to mean that a jury trial would be
available after the adoption of the Judiciary Act when the forum state's common-law courts would previously have provided
one,'0 ' it is inconceivable that the authors of the Act, who
were otherwise so meticulous about being explicit when they
wanted to require conformity to State practice, would have been
so vague about it in these critical provisions.' 2 Moreover, this
interpretation would defeat the purpose of each of these statutes-section 9's being to oust the state courts of at least "hard
core" admiralty cases like prize cases, section 16's to create a
common boundary between law and equity in all the federal
courts, even those in states whose courts recognized no such
distinction. Indeed, the whole reason why the Process Act
adopted state "forms and modes of proceeding" in "Suits at
common law" but not in equity or admiralty/maritime cases
(where the "forms and modes of proceeding" of civil law were to
apply), was that many states tried the latter cases in commonlaw courts and had no equity or maritime courts, forms, or
modes, and the federal courts were not going to conform to this
practice.
Not only am I unaware of any evidence that anyone in Congress has ever thought the Jury Trial Clause incorporated state
law; as far as I know, there is no evidence that any member of

law," but no equity jurisdiction. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
99. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over legal and equitable claims, but unlike section 11, section 13 referred to the cases in which there would be a right of
jury trial as "actions at law." See id. § 13, 1 Stat. at 81. See infra notes 290-92 and
accompanying text.
100. See id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82.
101. Textually, this would involve reading section 9's "the common law" and section 16's "law" to mean "the forum state's common-law courts."
102. See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 475 (1971) (suggesting clause

meant "to restore the jurisdictional balance between admiralty and common law
courts as it had existed in the colonies"). The interpretation of section 9 suggested in
the previous footnote would have erased federal admiralty jurisdiction entirely in
some states, a result that not even jury-enthusiast Thomas Jefferson would have
desired. See supra note 52.
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the federal judiciary has ever so understood the Clause. On the
contrary, there is affirmative evidence that early judges believed otherwise. Thus, as far as I know, no prize cases were
tried to a jury, and federal judges routinely presided over juryless equity trials in the eight states where the right to jury
trial extended to equity cases."0 3 Beyond this, rulings in a
number of unreported decisions from the early 1790s demonstrate that some of the first federal judges didn't understand
the Seventh Amendment to require that federal courts allow
civil jury trials whenever state common-law courts would. Finally, the first reported opinions shedding light on the matter
all point away from an incorporation-based view of the Jury
Trial Clause.
Hazzard v. Burrell,'" an action on a bond brought in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, was
a "Suit at common law" by anybody's lights. In the October
Term, 1791, after Hazzard had demurred to Burrell's plea, one
of them moved for a jury determination of Hazzard's damages. °5 The Seventh Amendment had not yet been ratified,'
but the Judiciary Act spoke to this motion, and if we assume,
as I have, that it is to be read in pari materia with the Jury
Trial Clause, that fact should make no difference.
The court denied the motion by a 2-1 vote. None of the judges made any allusions to Connecticut law in the opinions recorded in the court's journal. Chief Justice Jay and District
Court Judge Richard Law explained their votes against the

103. The point isn't merely that these trials were juryless: if "Suits at common
law" meant suits that would have been tried in the forum state's common-law courts,
these would all have been "actions at common law" in the federal courts, and they
shouldn't have been tried in federal equity, with or without a jury. For a discussion
of the startup problems in implementing federal equity jurisdiction in these states,
see GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 583-85. (The number of states in this situation is
derived from Hamilton's survey of state practice, which may be found in note 32
above.)
104. (C.C.D. Conn. Oct. Term 1791), in District of Connecticut-Journal of the Circuit Court (Oct. 25, 1791) (on file with Yale University Library, Manuscripts and
Archives, Baldwin Family Papers, MS Group 55, Series IV, Box 70, Folder 849) [hereinafter Journal].
105. The Journal does not disclose the substance of this plea or the identity of the
party seeking a jury trial on the quantum of damages.
106. The ratification process was completed in December 1791. See FARBER &
SHERRY, supra note 56, at 243-44.
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motion in terms of section 26 of the Judiciary Act, which provided that, where a defendant's liability on a bond was established by default, confession, or demurrer (i.e., without need for

a jury trial),
the court before whom the action is, shall render judgment
therein for the plaintiff to recover so much as is due according to equity. And when the sum for which judgment
should be rendered is uncertain, the same shall, if either of
the parties request it, be assessed by a jury."°
That is, they both stated that, as the damages were certain, no
jury would be necessary. Dissenting Justice Cushing, on the
other hand, is reported simply to have asserted, "In all cases if
the party desire it a Jury must be had."'0 8
Almost everything about this scenario is contrary to The Bill
of Rights' thesis. First, if the original understanding was that
federal civil litigants had a right to jury trial at least as broad
as they would have enjoyed in state courts, it's not clear why
section 26 wouldn't have had a proviso to the effect that the
parties could even demand a jury determination of certain damages if they would have that right in the state courts. 9 Second, if the judges shared this original understanding, it's hard
to see how the two judges who voted to deny the request for a
jury trial could have said nothing about the relevant Connecticut law."0 Third, this silence would be particularly hard to
understand because Richard Law, who had co-authored the

107. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 26, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
108. Hazard v. Burrell (C.C.D. Conn. Oct. Term 1791) in Journal, supra note 104,
at Oct. 29, 1791.
109. If state law determines the right to jury trial on the question of liability, it
presumably ought also to determine whether that right extends to the determination
of damages. Cf Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (applying constitutional
principles used to determine the right to a jury trial on the merits to decide if the
right applies to the determination of the amount of penalty). It is unclear, however,
whether any state then recognized a right even to a jury determination of uncertain
damages under theses circumstances. The issue is broached in Brown v. Van Braam,
3 U.S. 344 (1797), and Scheiner, supra note 16, at 156 n.69.
110. In several instances, the journal does report that a dispute concerned the
applicability or application of Connecticut law. See Hazzard v. Burrell (C.C.D. Conn.
Sept. Term 1792), in Journal, supra note 104; Motion to Reduce Clerk's Sealing Fee
(C.C.D. Conn. Oct. Term 1791), in Journal, supra note 104, at Oct. 31, 1791; Bates v.
Ward (C.C.D. Conn. Oct. Term 1791), in Journal, supra note 104, at Oct. 27, 1791.
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revision of Connecticut's statutes that was adopted in 1784, sat
on the state's Superior Court since 1784 and served'as its Chief
Judge from 1786 until he joined the federal bench in 1789,111

surely knew that Connecticut law provided no .right to jury trial
in this case.112 Fourth, given that Cushing seems not to have
(indeed, could not have) disputed his fellow judges' claim that
the sum due was not "uncertain", and that, as an "out-ofstater," he presumably would have deferred to Law's expertise
on state law, Connecticut law couldn't have been the basis for
the right he believed all litigants (at least in common-law cases) had to juries on demand."' Thus, this decision gives no
evidence that any of these three original federal judges believed
that the Jury Trial Clause incorporated state law, and it suggests that they may have had a contrary understanding.
The journal's report of a second case bolsters this argument.
Bache v. Skinner"' was a common-law case tried before a jury
on the first day of the October Term, 1791. The defendants won
a favorable verdict, and Bache requested a stay of execution
until he could file a petition for a new trial, a request the defendants naturally opposed. The Judiciary Act, which the parties invoked, made the issuance of such stays discretionary,'15
and counsel debated whether Bache had any plausible ground
to seek a new trial. The resolution of that question, in turn,
would have been governed by section 17 of the Judiciary Act,
which provided that federal courts could only grant new trials

111. With respect to Law's work on the revised statutes, see John D. Cushing,
Editorial Note, in THE FIRST STATE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT at v, vi
(John D. Cushing ed., 1982). Regarding his service on the state court, see 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1798-1800,
at 49 (Maeva Marcus et al., 1985-) [hereinafter DHSC].
112. See 2 ZEPHANIAH SwiFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 267 (Arno Press 1972) (1795).
113. Although Justice Cushing appears to have agreed there was no factual dispute in this case, his stated view resonates with the pro-jury spirit and language of
the Bay State's proposed amendment, which would have recognized a right to a jury
trial of "every issue of fact . . . if the parties or either of them request it" in civil
diversity cases such as this. For another possible example of Cushing's generous attitude towards civil jury trials, see infra notes 229, 235 and accompanying text.
114. (C.C.D. Conn. Oct. Term 1791), in Journal, supra note 104, at Oct. 25, 1791
and Nov. 3, 1791.
115. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 18, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
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"for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in
the courts of law.""'
If, as The Bill of Rights' thesis would require, the reference
to "common law" in the Jury Trial Clause and "the common
law" in section 9 of the Judiciary Act meant "the forum state's
common-law courts,""7 the last three words of the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause, which provides that "no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law,"" 8 would presumably have meant the same
thing."' So would section 17's reference to "the courts of law."
Thus, the proper resolution of the motion in Bache would have
turned on the rules governing the award of new trials in the
Connecticut courts.
Yet in Bache, even more obviously than in Hazzard, Jay and
Cushing gave no deference to the opinion of Judge Law, who
was now the dissenter. -The Court granted Bache's motion on
the ground that the reasons proffered by his counsel might
justify a new trial. While the journal doesn't report whether the
judges delivered any opinions in connection with this ruling, it
is (to put it mildly) rather unlikely that the judges disagreed
about the proper interpretation or application of Connecticut
law. Thus, it is unlikely that they believed that the Jury Trial
Clause was about conformity with state law.2
The third unreported eighteenth-century case I have found is
Higginson v. Greenwood,'' an important piece of litigation in116. Id. ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. at 83.
117. As to section 9, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
119. This would make sense as a matter of theory. If the Jury Trial Clause was
intended to preserve state-created jury trial rights by requiring federal courts to provide a jury trial whenever the forum state's courts would, it would be natural for the
Reexamination Clause to preserve those rights by prohibiting federal courts from
exceeding the forum state's limitations on the reexamination of juries' factual determinations. I will discuss the meaning of "the rules of the common law" below, in the
text accompanying notes 158-85.

120. In fact, if these provisions both mandated conformity with state jury trial
rights, every federal appeal decided without a jury in New England and Georgia
would have been decided unconstitutionally. See supra note 32. The only evidence of
federal appellate jury trials of which I am aware is discussed below, in the text ac-

companying notes 232-35 and in note 239.
121. (C.C.D.S.C. 1792). This case was widely and extensively reported in the press.
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volving the controversial question of the liability of American
debtors to creditors residing in England for interest on debts
that were not paid during the Revolutionary War. In this case,
the debt was owed by an American partnership to an AngloAmerican partnership whose surviving American partner was
also one of the debtor/defendants. The English partner filed the
case as an equity bill in the Federal Circuit Court in South
Carolina seeking money due under an agreement and a discovery of assets. According to a widely reprinted newspaper story,
the discovery having been completed, the following events occurred in October, 1792, before a bench consisting of Justice
William Paterson and Federal District Judge Thomas Bee:
[T]he counsel for the defendants applied to the court... to
have this cause referred to a jury, to find the quantum of
debt due; suggesting that as the object of the bill in equity
was answered (viz. a discovery assets) therefore plain, adequate and complete remedy could now be had at law. Judge
Paterson was for retaining the cause to be determined in
equity: Judge Bee for sending it to a jury to assess the balance then
due. The court being divided, the motion
122
[failed].
What was the ground for the judges' disagreement? Given
that Paterson had been a member of the First Senate, helped
draft the Judiciary Act of 1789, and served on the Conference
Committee on the Bill of Rights," it's hard to believe that
Bee challenged his interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause or
section 16 of the Judiciary Act, the provision cited by counsel.
If the dynamic conformity thesis is correct, Bee presumably
believed that the defendants would have had a right to a jury

The account that I present here is taken from the following sources: Federal Circuit
Court, CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston), Nov. 13, 1793, at 2; S.C
GAZETTE (Columbia), May 21, 1793, at 4; CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER
(Charleston), May 23, 1792, at 3. On the significance of the British merchants' use of
the new circuit courts to bring suits on pre-War debts, see Wythe Holt, "The Federal
Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects": The Failure
to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36
BUFF. L. REV. 301, 322-24 (1987).
122. Federal Circuit Court, CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston), Nov.
13, 1793, at 2.
123. See 4 DHSC, supra note 111, at 36 n.98; Further Senate Consideration (Sept.
21, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 501, 502.
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determination of the amount due in South Carolina's commonlaw courts. But is it really likely that the Justice from New
Jersey was rejecting this former state court judge's insight into
South Carolina practice?'"
The first official case reports that shed any light on the original understanding of the Jury Trial Clause are even more
strongly antithetical to The Bill of Rights' theory. In 1810, we
learn that Harry Innis, who had been the federal district court
judge in Kentucky since 1789, had recently announced that he
would no longer emulate the state courts by routinely employing advisory juries to find facts in equity cases involving
land.'" The leading student of Innis' judicial activities does
not attribute his previous conformity with Kentucky practice to
a belief that it was mandatory,' 6 but Innis' renunciation of
the practice proves that he didn't believe it was constitutionally
required. Moreover, Joseph Story's 1812 opinion referring approvingly to Innis' action 27 shows that he didn't think so either.
An opinion handed down six years later is evidence that the
rest of the Supreme Court agreed. One issue before the Court
in Robinson v. Campbell'25 was whether a federal circuit court
had erred in refusing to allow a party to raise an equitable
defense in an action at law when that would have been permitted in the forum state's courts. As the Court saw it, this raised
a question of statutory interpretation involving section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Rules of Decision Act) and the Process Act of 1792. The first of these provisions, familiar to generations of first year law students, provided "[t]hat the laws of
the several states except where the constitution, treaties or

124. On Bee's service on the state court, see Circuit Court Journal, District of
Georgia (Oct. 15, 1790), reprinted in 2 DHSC, supra note 111, at 102-03.
125. Innis' tenure on this federal district court is the subject of Mary K. Bonsteel
Tachau's pathbreaking book, Kentucky Courts in the Early Republic: Kentucky 17891816 (1978). His use of these juries is discussed in id. at 179-82. Kentucky's recognition of a right to a jury determination of the facts in these cases is noted in id. at
180 n.31. The official reports signaling Innis' decision not to follow state law on this
subject are Massie v. West, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 148 (1810), and United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 749-50 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
126. See TACHAU, supra note 125, at 180-82.
127. See Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 749-50.
128. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818).
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statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the Courts of the United States in cases where they apply."'29 The latter, which is less familiar to modern lawyers,

stated
[t]hat the forms of writs, executions and other process,
except their style and the forms and modes of proceeding in
suits in those of common law shall be the same as are now
used in the said courts respectively in pursuance of the
[Process Act of 1789], in those of equity and in those of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity
and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradistinguished from courts of common law; except so far as may
have been provided for by the [Judiciary Act of 1789],...
subject however to such alterations and additions as the
said courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the
United States shall think proper from time to time by rule
to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the
same ....

130

As Justice Todd described it for the Court, the question presented in Robinson was
whether it was the intention of Congress, by [these laws],
to confine the courts of the United States in their mode of
administering relief to the same remedies, and those only,
with all their incidents, which existed in the courts of the
respective states. In other words, whether it was their intention to give the party relief at law, where the practice of
the state courts would give it, and relief in equity only,
when according to such practice, a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy could not be had at law.13'
The Court unanimously ruled that Congress had not meant
so to restrict federal equity. If this holding wasn't incompatible
with a conformity-based understanding of the Jury Trial

129. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
130. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
131. Robinson, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 222.
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Clause, Justice Todd's rationale was. His analysis bears repeating in full:
In some states in the union, no court of chancery exists to
administer equitable relief. In some of those states, courts
of law recognise and enforce in suits at law, all the equitable claims and rights which a court of equity would
recognise and enforce; in others, all relief is denied and
such equitable claims and rights are to be considered as
mere nullities at law. A construction, therefore, that would
adopt the state practice in all its extent, would at once
extinguish, in such states, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. The acts of Congress have distinguished between remedies at common law and in equity, yet this construction
would confound them. The court, therefore think, that to
effectuate the purposes of the legislature, the remedies in
the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law
or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts,
but according to the principles of common law and equity,
from which we
as distinguished and defined in that country
1 32
derive our knowledge of those principles.
Robinson was not a fluke. The following year, the Court
unanimously reaffirmed Todd's position. One issue in United
States v. Howland & Allen ' 33 was whether a Massachusetts
statute creating a novel legal remedy deprived a federal court
sitting in that state of the equity jurisdiction that it otherwise
would have had. John Marshall's response for the Court was a
more abbreviated restatement of Todd's view, but it was no less
inconsistent with that of The Bill of Rights. "[Ais the courts of
the Union have a chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the
judiciary act confers the same chancery powers on all, and gives
the same rule of decision," the Chief Justice wrote, "its jurisdiction in Massachusetts must be the same as in other
states."'"
The Court has never wavered in its commitment to this principle. More broadly, as far as I can tell, no federal official has
ever-even implicitly-endorsed a dynamic conformity understanding of the Jury Trial Clause. Also, as far as I am aware,
132. Id. at 222-23.
133. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108 (1819).
134. Id. at 115.
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no previous commentator has ever expressed such a view." 5
In fact, the only eighteenth century exegeses of the Jury Trial
Clause that I have found likewise indicate that this wasn't the
original understanding of the Seventh Amendment.
The backdrop of these commentaries was the question of the
status of the common law as federal law. 13 In a 1799 grand
jury charge, Oliver Ellsworth, now Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, said that the grand jury had the authority to enforce not only federal statutes and international law,
but the common law's proscription of "acts manifestly subversive of the national government, or of some of its powers specified in the constitution."' The common law, Ellsworth continued,
brought from the country of our ancestors, with here and
there an accommodating exception, in nature of local customs, was the law of every part of the union at the formation of the national compact; and did, of course, attach upon
or apply
to it, for the purposes of exposition and enforce1
ment. 3

A Jeffersonian from Virginia who called himself Citizen wrote
an essay attacking this doctrine, 139 which he feared would
make the federal government all-powerful and the state governments "useless burthens."' One reason he gave for denying
that the Constitution had adopted the common law as federal
law was that the only place in that document in which the

135. As The Bill of Rights notes, see AMAR, supra note 1, at 91, Charles Wolfram

deemed this "the theory [of the Jury Trial Clause] that is best supported by the historical materials," but rejected it nonetheless. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 732-34;
see also Klein, supra note 6, at 1020 & n.72, 1034-36 (mentioning theory as one possible interpretation of Clause but rejecting it).
136. Some of the leading studies of this question are cited in 3 DHSC, supra note
111, at 322 n.28.
137. Oliver Ellsworth's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the
District of South Carolina (May 7, 1799), reprinted in 3 DHSC, supra note 111, at
357.
138. Id. at 358.
139. See Letter from "Citizen" to Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice of the United
States (Aug. 9, 1789), reprinted in 3 DHSC, supra note 111, at 375. I infer that Citizen was a Virginian from his use of the word "we" to describe them. See id. at 378.
140. Citizen discusses the implications for the federal system of the incorporation
of the common law into the national law in id. at 379-80. The quoted language appears in id. at 379.
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words "common law" appeared was the Seventh Amendment,
which only used them "to narrow the jurisdiction of the federal
court."' He explained,
By the constitution, as originally formed, the supreme court
had appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact; under
this judicial power, it was feared that the use of juries
would be destroyed, to prevent which, it is provided in the
[seventh] amendment, that "in suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined, in any court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law;" the words common law are here used to distinguish the case meant to be provided for [i.e., cases at common law] from chancery cases. It would be singular indeed,
if this clause of the constitution, which was evidently inby a
tended to abridge the power of the federal court should
4
forced and false construction be made to extend it.' 2

Later that year, the issue resurfaced in the prosecution of
Isaac Williams for violating Jay's Treaty with Britain by accepting a commission from the French Government to commit hosWilliams' defense was
tile acts against British shipping.
that he had renounced his American citizenship and become a
Frenchman. Chief Justice Ellsworth declared that this evidence
was inadmissable, because under the common law of England,
which still obtained in this Nation, Williams lacked the authority unilaterally to renounce his citizenship. Judge Law, who sat
with Ellsworth, seems to have been unsure of the law and felt
the matter should be resolved by the jury, so the government's
motion to exclude the evidence was overruled. Nonetheless,
Williams was convicted.
A pseudonymous author (Francis Wharton suggested that he
was Philip Nicholas, a fervid Jeffersonian from Virginia'")
141. Id. at
142. Id. at
nation Clause
262-63.
143. For a

377.
377-78. For later court opinions limiting the protection of the Reexamito "Suits at common law," see infra, text accompanying notes 236-37,

report of this case, see FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 652 (1849) and
United States v. Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708).
144. See WHARTON, supra note 143, at 658, 694-95, 726. An able lawyer (he be-
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wrote a series of widely circulated essays criticizing Ellsworth's
view, particularly the notion that there was a national common
law. 4 5 In the course of attacking the proposition that the
British common law applied federally, Aristogiton explored the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment. His comments on the Jury
Trial Clause read as follows:
There is only one part of the constitution in which the
common law is mentioned; this is the [Seventh Amendment]. This article however I contend does not establish
that law. What does that article say? ...
This is evidently intended to preserve the trial by jury.
The words common law are made use of to distinguish
them from causes in equity. The first part of the article
then, when rightly construed runs thus: "Congress shall not
prescribe any other mode of trial, than the trial by jury, for
such legal pecuniary causes as are of twenty dollars value,
and which are cognizable in the courts of the United States;
but in such legal pecuniary causes as are of less than twenty dollars value, and in such equity causes as are cognizable in the federal courts, congress may prescribe some other
mode of trial than the trial by jury."'46
If the Jury Trial Clause was understood to delegate to the
states the authority to determine the minimum scope of the
jury trial rights of civil litigants in the federal courts within
their borders, it is incomprehensible that any Jeffersonian polemicist would have failed emphatically to make this point. This
is particularly true inasmuch as the nub of each of these two
essays was that if the entire common law of England was federal (and therefore supreme) law, there could be virtually no
state law at all, and the states' power would be extinguished by

came the Attorney General of Virginia at 21), Nicholas helped defend James
Callender in one the most famous trials ever held in this country, United States v.
Callender. See United States v. Callender, 10 AM. ST. TRIALS 813, 821 & n.5. (C.C.D.

Va. 1800).
145. See Remarks on Judge Ellsworth's decision, in the case of Isaac Williams, 1
National Magazine, or, A Political, Historical, Biographical, and Literary Repository,
No. 3, at 256 (1799) [hereinafter Remarks]; Remarks on Judge Ellsworth's late judicial decision, that an American citizen cannot expatriate himself, 1 National Magazine,
or, A Political, Historical, Biographical, and Literary Repository No. 4, at 385 (1799).
For evidence of the wider publication of these essays, see 3 DHSC, supra note 111,
at 322 n.34, and WHARTON, supra note 143, at 658.
146. Remarks, supra note 145, at 260.
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the federal leviathan. Thus, the failure of the Citizen and
Aristogiton to say more than that the Jury Trial Clause distinguished "legal" and "equitable" cases shows that they could not
have understood the Clause in the manner that The Bill of
Rights suggests.'47

III. THE SUPREME COURT'S "ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING" OF
THE JURY TRIAL CLAUSE

The evidence reviewed in the previous section does more than
demonstrate that The Bill of Rights' interpretation of the
Creators' Jury Trial Clause can't be right. It also calls into
question the Supreme Court's longstanding view of the original
meaning of that Clause, and thus the prevailing law on the
subject. A more complete examination of the historical record
only strengthens my conviction that the Court's current understanding of the Creators' intent is in this case wrong.
A. The HistoricalRecord From the FederalistEra (And Slightly
Beyond)
Very little support was voiced during the ratification debates
for a constitutional amendment incorporating the English right

147. Before concluding my discussion of The Bill of Rights' thesis, I shall deliver
my promised response to its theoretical argument for its dynamic conformity interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause. See supra note 24. Although state law cases may
have been the largest group of jury-submissible cases litigated in federal courts in the
early years of the New Republic, the Jury Trial Clause was written for the ages, and
there is no indication that its potential implication in civil "arising under' cases was
less important to the Creators. See RITZ, supra note 92, at 60, 223 n.27. That's part
of the difference between our Clause and the guarantee proposed by the Massachusetts ratifying convention. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53, 82-83. Be that as
it may, the theoretical appeal of an interpretation of the Constitution doesn't make it
the original understanding.
One more point. If we are simply to focus upon the jurisdiction exercised by
the early federal courts, one of what the book calls the two "paradigmatic Seventh
Amendment cases," AAM~, supra note 1, at 91, can't have been. That group is trespass suits brought against federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment. Since
there was no reason to believe these men would victimize citizens of other states,
and since trial courts weren't given federal question jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act,
these cases presumably wouldn't have been within the contemplation of the Creators,
and they typically couldn't have been brought in federal court at the time of the
Creation.
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to civil jury trial. One essayist proposed this solution to the

diverse-state-practice problem cited by the Federalists as the
principal obstacle to the adoption of a constitutional guarantee
4

148
In addition, as Madison knew,
of a civil jury trial right.

1

the New York convention formally proffered just such a
guarantee when it ratified the Constitution, one providing
"[t]hat the trial by Jury in the extent that it obtains by the
Common Law of England is one of the greatest securities to the
rights of a free People, and ought to remain inviolate."'5 °
Madison didn't propose this amendment to the House. Had
its only shortcoming been that it wasn't limited to private litigation, he could have amended it to read, "In suits between
man and man, the trial by Jury in the extent that it obtains by
the Common Law of England is one of the greatest securities to
the rights of a free People, and ought to remain inviolate." But
he didn't do that, either. Instead, he performed more extensive
surgery on the Virginia proposal, and grafted onto it the words
"at common law" to describe the private disputes to which the
right to jury trial would extend.' 5 '
If Madison meant "Suits at common law" to signify those in
which a right to jury trial existed under the British common
law, his draftsmanship can only be described as perverse.
Hamilton's essay had recently claimed that the words "Actions
at common law" in the Massachusetts proposal denoted "the
civil jury rights recognized in the courts of the forum state,"
and The Foreign Spectator had apparently agreed. 5 ' It is even
possible that this proposal is what led the New York ratifying
convention explicitly to spell out its intent to privilege the right
to jury trial recognized under "the Common Law of England."'53 Whatever the explanation for its wording, that proposal hadn't generated a perceptible surge of public support for
incorporating the British right to civil jury trial in the Constitu-

148. See A Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in Cogan,
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 554, 554.
149. See supra text accompanying note 82.
150. New York Proposal, New York Ratification Convention (July 26, 1788), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 507, 507.
151. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
152. As to my hesitation regarding The Spectator, see note 68, above.
153. See supra note 63.
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tion. Under these circumstances, why would Madison have used
the words "Suits at common law" to accomplish this? Why not
borrow more heavily from the New York guarantee?" 4
. I can only think of one reason for Madison not to have
tracked the language of New York's proposal if he meant to
incorporate its substance in the Constitution. Perhaps he felt it
would be politically incorrect to suggest putting the name of the
country against which we had recently fought a long and bloody
war of independence into the Bill of Rights.'55 Three years later, anti-British feelings were still so high that Oliver
Ellsworth's reference to "England" in a revision of the Process
Act was unacceptable to the Senate.'56 But if that was the
problem,'57 why didn't Madison simply strip New York's
amendment of the words "of England?"
Interestingly enough, the phrase "the common law" does
appear in the Reexamination Clause, which was written in
response to the Antifederalists' concerns about the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over "Fact.""' In Madison's initial draft of the Bill, the Reexamination Clause was paired with
an amount-in-controversy limitation on appeals to the Supreme
Court.'59 These two provisions were to be inserted at the end
154. See note 81, above, on Madison's direct and indirect borrowing from New
York's proposal. (Maryland's 1776 Declaration of Rights contained another possible
model for a civil jury guarantee of this nature. See Maryland: Declaration of Rights
(1776), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 508, 508.)
155. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature,
93 COLUm. L. REv. 547, 566-68 (1993), on post-War anti-British sentiment in the
former colonies and some of its implications for the law.
156. See GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 546.
157. I have some doubts on this score. While people with strong anti-British sentiments might have taken offense at a reference to England in the Bill of Rights, given
that the use of this phrase in the Jury Trial Clause would have been the AntiFederalists' idea, what political price would it have entailed? Anyway, if everyone
knew that the omitted words were implied by the remaining text, how many of these
patriots would have been satisfied by the charade? Cf. Diary of William Maclay (July
10-11, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 595,
595 (recounting confrontation in which Maclay asked why Sen. William S. Johnson
didn't propose a Judiciary Act clause allowing trial of civil cases under civil law procedures, Johnson replied he didn't like the name "Civil law," and Maclay sarcastically
responded, "you need not care about the name, since you have got the thing"). But
see GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 546, 581 (suggesting that this happened in the case
of the Process Act of 1792).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
159. See Proposal by Madison in House (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COM-
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of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, which governs the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 6 ° The Jury Trial Clause, on the other
hand, was supposed to become part of Clause 3.161
No State proposed a Reexamination Clause during the ratification debate and none had one in its constitution, but Alexander Hamilton sketched the outlines of a statutory solution to
this problem in The Federalist Papers. Hamilton's Publius suggested that Congress might
provide that in appeals to the Supreme Court there should
be no re-examination of facts where they had been tried in
the original causes by juries.... [B]ut if, [because some
states let juries decide prize cases] it should be thought too
extensive, it might be qualified with a limitation to such
causes only as are determinable at common law in that
mode of trial. 2
Possibly drawing on this passage," Madison wrote a proposal that read "nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to
the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than
may consist with the principles of common law."' The House
Committee of Eleven, on which Madison served, revised this
text. The Committee's language, adopted by the House, was,
"nor shall any fact, triable by a jury according to the course of
the common law, be otherwise re-examinable than according to
the rules of common law."'65 The insertion of this "the" before
the first, but not the second, "common law," may indicate that
the Committee, if not the House, perceived a difference between

PLETE
160.
161.
162.
163.

BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 493, 493.
See id.
See id.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 30, at 490-91.
In light of Madison's intention that this clause and the appellate amount-in-

controversy clause with which it was joined be placed at the end of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 (i.e., that it be tied with the provision governing the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction) and its textual similarities with Hamilton's proposal, a
borrowing hypothesis is plausible. But these resonances may simply be coincidental.
164. Proposal by Madison in House (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 493, 493.
165. Committee Report (July 28, 1789), reprinted in Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 29 (emphasis added); Further House Consideration (Aug.
21, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 497, 497
(emphasis added).
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"common law" and "the common law." But it may simply reflect
a sense that "the course of common law" sounded awkward,
while "the rules of common law" didn't. Naturally (and unfortunately for legal scholars), if anyone said anything about why
this "the" mattered, his insight was not preserved for posterity.
On September 4, the Senate amended this article.16 This
amendment accomplished three things. First, it deleted the
,appellate amount-in-controversy provision, making the Reexamination Clause a freestanding sentence. Second, it specified that
the Clause only limited the authority of federal courts to reexamine facts. Third, it deleted the article "the" preceding the
first "common law" in the House proposal. Thus, this amendment suggests that the Senate, too, may have viewed this article as having some significance."' Once again, however, we
have no record of what that perceived import might have been.
Five days later, the Senate took up both remaining civil jury
proposals. This time, it tinkered with the amount-in-controversy
language of the Jury Trial Clause and combined that Clause
with the Reexamination Clause to form a new amendment,
which became our Seventh. At the same time, it modified the
Reexamination Clause. This revision changed "[n]o fact, triable
by a jury according to the course of common law" into "no fact
tried by a jury" and "the rules of common law" into "the rules
of the common law." 68 Yet again, this was done without a
surviving word of explanation.
The two parts of the Seventh Amendment are the only two
places in the Constitution where the term "common law" appears. The legislative history reviewed above shows that the
House and the Senate each changed the text of the Reexamination Clause at least once to switch a "common law" into "the

166. See Further Senate Consideration (Sept. 4, 1789), reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 499, 499. As amended, the clause now read,
"No fact, triable by a jury according to the course of common law, shall be otherwise
reexaminable in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law." Id.
167. It is possible, of course, that the article was deleted for aesthetic reasons, or
so that no one would draw any false inferences from the fact that the Clauses two
references to "common law" didn't look alike.
168. For all of these changes, see Further Senate Consideration (Sept. 9-12, 1789),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 500, 500-01.
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common law" or vice versa. The critical question, for present
purposes, is whether these changes had any substantive significance.
I am persuaded that the September 9 addition of "the" did.
No one had previously thought "the rules of common law" needed another article, so the phrase was presumably not considered lacking in style or grace. Why, then, was it suddenly considered defective?
The reason, I believe, is that the Reexamination Clause was
now conjoined with the Jury Trial Clause. Madison's original
proposal provided that the reexamination rules "of common law"
would apply to facts "triable by jury, according to the course of
common law."" 9 Hamilton's Publius had used "according to
the course of canon or civil law,""'0 and Joseph Story would
later use "according to the course of common law," to mean
"according to the rules governing proceedings in [the relevant
courts]."1 ' Thus, Madison's proposal (as modified by the Committee of Eleven), bound the federal courts to observe the reexamination "rules of common law" with respect to facts that
were "triable by jury" under the rules governing "common-law
courts." In other words, it limited the power of federal courts to
review juries' factual determinations only in "common-law cases."
The fact that neither Madison nor anyone else appears to
have considered referring in the Reexamination Clause to "facts
triable by jury in Suits at common law" suggests that the Jury
Trial Clause and Reexamination Clause applied to different
groups of cases. The Senate's actions of September 9 reinforce
this inference. It was only when "according to the course of
common law" was dropped and "Actions at common law" was
placed in the same amendment as "the rules of common law"
that the latter term required change.
This suggests that "the rules of the common law" meant
something different from "the rules of common law." If that's
true, the most sensible assumption to make would be that "the

169. See text accompanying note 164.
170. See supra note 32.
171. See supra note 32, infra text accompanying note 248.
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common law" was the common law of England.'72 What other
(singular) set of common-law reexamination rules was there?
The reexamination rules in the states' common-law courts
would not have fit this bill. In five states, according to
Hamilton's tally,"3 the strict English common-law rules 74
had been replaced by statutory or constitutional provisions
authorizing trial de novo as of right on appeal from an adverse
decision in a civil case.'75 Thus, if "the rules of the common
law" had been meant to incorporate state reexamination rules,
as often as not, they wouldn't have been "common law" rules.
Even if the term had merely been meant to require federal
conformity with the rules in the state's common-law courts, to
which state's rules would this amendment have referred, the
state in which a federal trial court sat and a jury rendered a
verdict, or the state in which the appellate court was being
asked to reexamine that verdict? And what if the appellate
court sat in the federal district, which was not a state?
By September 9, the Senate had long since passed the Judiciary Act, and (as I have already emphasized) that law bears
testimony to the fact that the Senate knew how to write a clear
conformity provision. In fact, two of the Act's principal authors,
Oliver Ellsworth and William Paterson, 76 were almost certainly there when the September 9 revisions were made, 77
and the surviving draft of the amendments the Senate adopted
that day is in Ellsworth's hand.' It's hard to believe that
172. Julius Goebel draws the same inference. See GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 437,
449. (On the latter occasion, however, he seems to have forgotten that we don't know
what was said in the Senate on September 4.)
173. See supra note 32. The variety of new trial rules then followed in the states
is noted in GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 481-82.
174. See infra text accompanying note 236. These rules were recently canvassed in
Gasparini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
175. In United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750), Justice Story argued that this modification had been effected by statute in
the New England states. In Georgia, it seems to have been accomplished by a constitutional provision. GA. CONST. art. XL (1777).
176. Ellsworth's contribution to the Judiciary Act, is detailed in 4 DHSC, supra
note 111, at 36 n.98. He also helped write the Process Act of 1789. See 4 DHSC,
supra note 111, at 108-10. With respect to Paterson's work on the Judiciary Act, see
the text accompanying note 123, above. His contribution to the Process Act is noted
in 4 DHSC, supra note 111, at 108.
177. See Journal of the First Session of the Senate of the United States, reprinted
in 1 DHFFC, supra note 94, at 166-68.
178. See Senate Amendments (Sept. 9, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHFFC, supra note
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they had nothing to do with this change, and it's harder still to
believe that they would have acquiesced in (much less proposed) the constitutionalization of a conformity rule couched in
such obscure language. 79
Still more importantly, a conformity-based reading of the
Reexamination Clause would be inconsistent with several provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 17 of that Act gave
federal courts "power to grant new trials, in cases where there
has been a trial by Jury, for reasons for which new trials have
usually been granted in the courts of law,"8 ' not "in the
Courts of law of each state respectively."8 ' And sections 22
and 25 categorically barred federal appellate courts from "reexamin[ing]" civil judgments or decrees (including those rendered by state courts) "on a writ of error... for any error in
fact,"" 2 without regard to the rules of any state's courts.
While the latter omission might be excused on the ground that
the Seventh Amendment doesn't prevent a federal court from
being more protective of jury verdicts than the relevant state's
courts by completely banning fact-reexamination, its plain language would prohibit a federal court from reexamining juryfound facts on any basis--even a more protective one--different
from the relevant state's. Thus, if, at the time the Act became
law, the prior practice "in Courts of law" had been only to allow
the limited appellate reexamination of facts authorized under
British law, but the relevant state courts authorized retrials on
appeal as of right at the time a party sought reexamination,
the Act would have authorized reexamination not conforming to
state law, and would to that extent have been unconstitutional."

94, at 43-45.
179. Of course, if the Congress believed it was necessary to write "the common
law" to signify conformity with state court rules in this Clause, we would have yet
another reason to doubt that the Jury Trial Clause's bare reference to "common law"
was meant to mandate such conformity.
180. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
181. See the text accompanying notes 89-92 for the derivation and significance of
the italicized language.
182. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84-87.
183. Note that, unlike the conformity-based interpretation of the Reexamination
Clause, the language of section 17 appears to prescribe a static, rather than a dynamic, limitation on reexamination.

1999]

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

453

It therefore seems clear that the First Congress understood
"the rules of the common law" to refer to English law" and
"Suits at common law" to mean something else." If further
evidence was needed that the Congress did not intend "Suits at
common law" to signify actions triable in England's common-law
courts, it exists. The Judiciary Act used these very words
(among others) to describe "legal," as opposed to "equitable" or
"admiralty/maritime" cases," and that Act did not use this
phrase to denote actions that would have been brought in the
English common law courts, as opposed to British equity or
admiralty courts.
The extent of federal equity jurisdiction was defined in section 16. As previously noted, 87 that provision limited federal

184. "The common law" appears only once in the Judiciary Act, and I believe it
was used there in a similar way. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The
term does not appear in the Process Act of 1789.
185. This should scarcely be surprising, given that Americans agreed about what
"the common law" was and disagreed about the appropriate scope of the common-law
courts' jurisdiction.
186. "Suits at common law" is used in sections 9 and 11 of the Act, "actions at
common law" in section 30. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 30, 1 Stat. at
76-79. Sections 13 and 15 speak of "actions at law!' See id. §§ 13, 15, 1 Stat. at 8082. (In the latter instance, the statute contrasts these actions with those "in chancery.") Section 22 distinguishes "civil Actions" from "suits in equity." See id. § 22, 1
Stat. at 84-85. For a discussion of the difference between "Suits at common law" and
"actions at law," see infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
Rachael Schwartz argues that the civil jury trial provisions of the Judiciary Act
must have a different meaning than the Jury Trial Clause because they would otherwise have been superfluous. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 620-21. Even if we were
to assume that the First Congress shared her feelings about redundancy, they would
have been inapplicable here: the Congress couldn't be sure that the states would
ratify the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, although the states ultimately did ratify
that amendment, there was an interval during which the Act assured litigants a
right to jury trial and the Clause could not. For a decision rendered during this
hiatus, see supra notes 104-13 and the accompanying text.
Finally, I should note that the Judiciary Act was likely written with the language of James Madison's proposed civil jury amendment in mind. Madison introduced his proposals in the House on June 8. On June 12, the Senate subcommittee
charged with drafting a judiciary bill presented its work to the full committee, which
then introduced it in the Senate. See Judiciary Act of 1789, reprinted in 4 DHSC,
supra note 111, at 23 (citations omitted). The phrase "suits at common law" was not
present in the versions of sections 9 and 11 reported by subcommittee member Caleb
Strong to Robert Treat Paine on May 24, but did appear in the June 12 draft. See
Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May 24, 1789), reprinted in 4
DHSC, supra note 111, at 397; Judiciary Bill (June 12, 1789), reprinted in 5 DHFFC,
supra note 94, at 1178.
187. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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equity suits to situations in which no "plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had by law.""s In light of my earlier
observations about the Act's drafting, the most striking thing
about this provision is what it doesn't say, and it doesn't say
anything looking like a clear reference to English practice.
Unlike Ellsworth's proposed amendment to the Process Act of
1792,189 it doesn't explicitly mention the English courts. Perhaps Ellsworth, too, thought that politically unacceptable in
1789."g° But section 15 of the Judiciary Act did speak of "the
ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery,"' and this euphemism is also absent here. Nor does section 16 even refer, as did
the Process Act of 1792, to "the principles, rules, and usages
which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty
respectively, as contradistinguished from Courts of common
law."' 92 Most important of all, unlike the Reexamination
Clause and section 9 of the Judiciary Act, which excepted certain cases from the juryless admiralty jurisdiction," it doesn't
make equity jurisdiction turn on the remedies available under
"the common law."
This linguistic analysis suggests that section 16 wasn't meant
to give federal courts the same equity jurisdiction as their British counterparts, and its legislative history bolsters this inference.'9 4 Federal equity was the subject of great controversy in
the Senate, because it implicated the right to jury trial. When
the Judicial Bill was introduced, section 16 provided that federal courts couldn't exercise equity jurisdiction "in any case where
remedy may be had at law.""' Equity enthusiasts first

188. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
189. Ellsworth's amendment, which was previously mentioned in the text accompanying note 156, read that 'the modes of proceeding in causes of equity & of admiralty & maritime jurisdiction shall be, except where the laws of the United States
otherwise provide, according to the course of proceedings heretofore accustomed in
causes of similar jurisdiction in the respective courts of England

....

"

4 DHSC,

supra note 111, at 197.
190. Cf GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 546, 581 (suggesting this is why Ellsworth's
1792 amendment to the Process Act failed).
191. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
192. Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. I believe the Supreme
Court understood this passage to refer to the respective English courts. See GOEBEL,
supra note 102, at 547, 581.
193. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
194. See R1Tz, supra note 95, at 175-77.
195. Senate Bill, section 16 (July 13, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHSC, supra note 111,
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changed this to "complete remedy" and then threw out the
whole thing, preferring to leave the line between law and equity unregulated by statute. Their opponents, relatively pro-jury
men, fought back. They got their statutory restriction on equity
jurisdiction, but at a price: it was even more watered down, as
the legal remedy had to be "plain, adequate and complete" to
oust equity.'96
William Maclay was right: this was not a federalization of
English Chancery jurisdiction.'
It's not just the fact that
there was no directive to look to the English Chancellors' decisions to gauge when a legal remedy fit the bill. As Maclay
recognized,' 8 a legal remedy didn't have to be "plain, adequate and complete" to bar equity jurisdiction in Britain.'99
Moreover, as Justice Baldwin noted in 1831, the English Chancery sometimes exercised concurrent jurisdiction with the common-law
courts, even though the same relief was available in
20 0
both.
One final point would seem conclusive. Section 16 doesn't
make the availability of federal equity jurisdiction turn on the
existence of a "plain, adequate and complete [legal] remedy" at
any particular historical moment prior to the time of suit. It's a
dynamic rule, not a static one, and it's impossible to believe
that anybody would have intended the jury trial rights of future
litigants to turn on future legal developments in a country from
which Americans had already been independent for years.
at 74.
196. Thus, I think Eric Grant underestimated the scope of federal equity jurisdiction and overstated the right to jury trial. See Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of
the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 144,
170 (1996).
197. See Diary of William Maclay (July 13, 1789), 9 DHFFC, supra note 94, at
107. In the end, the courts did not construe this standard in the way Maclay did;
they equated it with the comparable English Chancery rule. See, e.g., Harrison v.
Rowan, 11 F. Cas. 666, 667 (C.C.D.N.J. 1819) (Washington, J.). However, it should be
noted that the Senate proceedings in 1789 were held in secret and that Justice
Washington had no access to Senator Maclay's diary, which remained unpublished
until many years later. (A highly abridged version was first published in 1880. See 9
DHFFC, supra note 94, at xvii. The full surviving text was not published until 1988.)
198. See 9 DHFFC, supra note 94, at xvii.
199. See Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 445 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764)
(Baldwin, J.).
200. See id. at 445-46. Justice Washington seems to have forgotten this in Harrison, 11 F. Cas. at 667-68.
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Now consider the scope of admiralty jurisdiction under the
Act. Section 9, part of which is set forth above, broadly defined
the district courts' "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and
then excluded therefrom those cases in which "the common law"
could provide "a common law remedy.""' Julius Goebel speculated that, given the lack of a clear sense of the scope of maritime jurisdiction under English law and the expansive definition given to it in some of the states since independence, this
caveat represented a refusal to exercise the full scope of the
potential federal jurisdiction to the detriment of jury trial rights
existing under "the common law." °2 If he's right, the Act didn't regard British law as limiting the permissible scope of the
federal courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, either. And
as many as three early Supreme Court cases may have held
that neither the Act nor the Constitution so confined these
heads of federal jurisdiction. °3
In my view, this analysis demonstrates that the First Congress did not intend the Jury Trial Clause to constitutionalize
the right to civil jury trial that was recognized in the commonlaw courts of England in 1791. But even if that had been
Congress' intention, only clairvoyant ratifiers could have known,
and there probably weren't many of them around." 4 In fact,
there is not a single shred of evidence indicating that anyone in
the First Congress, or any ratifier, thought that the parameters
of the right to jury trial preserved by the Clause had been fixed
by the English courts in 1791.
Nor is there any hint in the historical record that any federal
judge so understood the Clause during the Nation's first two
decades of existence. In fact, the unreported eighteenth-century
201. See supra text accompanying note 95.
202. See GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 474-75; see also Ritz, supra note 92, at 65.
203. See United States v. The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443
(1808); United States v. The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406 (1805); United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1799-1888, at 2325 (1985).
204. The Senate met behind closed doors for the first six years. Like James
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention (which were published in 1840),
William Maclay's diary, which sheds some light on what went on in the Senate from
1789-91, wasn't published until many years later. See 9 DHFFC, supra note 197. The
historical record includes no further information that could have helped the ratifiers
understand the meaning of the Jury Trial Clause.
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cases mentioned above point in the opposite direction. Although
their decision may well have been consistent with English
law," 5 Chief Justice Jay and Judge Law seem to have been
following section 26 of the Judiciary Act in Hazzard.2 6 However, Justice Cushing's insistence that there was a right to a
jury trial on the plaintiffs damages despite section 26 couldn't
have been based on English law. His opinion therefore indicates
that he may not have felt that English law was the touchstone
of our constitutional right to jury trial. Moreover, as nothing in
his colleagues' opinions suggests that they found his generous
view of the scope of the right to jury trial to be illegitimate,
they may have agreed.07
Similarly, it's hard to believe that Justice Paterson and
Judge Bee disagreed about the legitimacy of retaining equity
jurisdiction after the completion of discovery in Higginson because they had different opinions about whether an English
equity court would refuse specifically to enforce the parties'
contract on the ground that a debt suit would give the plaintiff
an adequate legal remedy.08 Moreover, given Paterson's involvement in the adoption of the Jury Trial Clause and the Judiciary Act,20 9 I doubt that they disagreed about which legal
standard to apply. Rather, I suspect that both men felt the one
set forth in section 16 of the Judiciary Act (and invoked by
counsel) was to govern their decision, and that it (and the Jury
Trial Clause) allowed them to make up their own minds about
the sufficiency of the legal remedy. In other words, I think that
William Paterson, who had tried to delete, and then dilute, section 16 when he was in the Senate, 10 was simply implementing a more expansive view of American equity jurisdiction than
Judge Bee in this case.2 '
205. See, e.g., Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 348 (1797).
206. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 104-13, above.
207. Of course, it's possible that the opinions were poorly reported in the journal.
However, Simeon Baldwin, the clerk who wrote it, was a first-rate lawyer, and there's
no reason to assume that he omitted important aspects of the opinions he chose to
record.
208. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 121-24, above.
209. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
210. This story is recounted in the text accompanying notes 173-75, above. For
Paterson's positions in these debates, see RITZ, supra note 76, at 176, and Diary of
William Maclay (July 1, 1789 & July 10, 1789), reprinted in 9 DHFFC, supra note
94, at 95, 106.
211. Thus, my analysis would be the same if Paterson had felt the case was gov-
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The earliest officially reported decisions may be even more
tantalizing, but they're even more opaque. La Vengeance,212
The Schooner Sally,"' and The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte"' were libels tried as admiralty and maritime cases in
the lower federal courts, without a jury. Between 1796 and
1808, each of them wound up before the Supreme Court, and in
each case it was asserted that the libel didn't fall within the
federal courts' civil admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The
Schooner Sally was decided (on the basis of the Court's prior
ruling in La Vengeance) without oral argument, and the challenged jurisdiction upheld. In the other two cases, Charles Lee
argued that Article III limited federal admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction to the scope that it had in English law at an historic moment" 5 and that, as the libels in question could only
have been brought in the common-law courts under the relevant English law, the lower courts had violated the Judiciary
Act by trying them without a jury."6 In his 1808 argument in
The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, he went even further, asserting as well that, '[bly the 7th amendment, in suits at common
law the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, i.e. continued
as it then was. At the time all [cases like this] were triable at
common law." 17 While he didn't spell it all out, Lee's logic was
clear-just as Article III incorporated the jurisdictional limitations on English admiralty existing in 1789, the Jury Trial
Clause constitutionalized the scope of the jury trial right available in the English common-law courts in 1791.18
erned by the Process Act of 1792.
212. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796).
213. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406 (1805).
214. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443 (1808).
215. In La Vengeance, he argued that the Revolution was the critical moment. See
3 U.S. at 300. In The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, he declared that it was the adoption of the Constitution. See 8 U.S. at 447.
216. See The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. at 451; LaVengeance, 6 U.S. at
299-300.
217. 8 U.S. at 451.
218. This theory raised potential questions like which date was the one at which
federal equity jurisdiction was fixed and what to do if any developments occurred
during the two year gap, but these questions were ultimately of minimal significance.
This is, however, but one proof of the fact that modern scholars are wrong to suggest
that the idea that the Jury Trial Clause "preserved" the right as it existed on some
specified date was a post-Reconstruction development. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note
8, at 601-02; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 6-7, 734 & n.284. More proof may be found
in note 269, below.
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While this made Lee the first person known to have claimed
that the Jury Trial Clause defined the civil jury right according
to the English precedents of 1791, it did not make him a winner in court. In fact, he lost both cases. Each time, the Court's
published opinion was maddeningly vague about whether the
Court was rejecting his interpretation of Article 111.2 9 If it
was, as many people (including Chief Justice John Marshall)
believed,' ° the ruling(s) would have had obvious implications
for Lee's interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause.22 '
Lee's argument also failed to make him the first person to
take a public position on the relevance of eighteenth-century
English practice to our Jury Trial Clause. Aristogiton beat him
to the punch by almost a decade. In the portion of his 1799
essay that was quoted and discussed above, 2 Aristogiton denied that the Jury Trial Clause meant to signal the incorporation of English common law into federal law. Immediately
thereafter, he quoted the Reexamination Clause and remarked,
"This admits that the rules of the common law relative to the
re-examination of causes [are] in force in the United States but
does not admit that any other rules of that law are in
force."' Including, it would seem, the rules of the common
law relative to the right to trial by jury in civil cases. Plainly,
if this essayist had wanted to say the Jury Trial Clause incorporated those rules into the Constitution, he knew how to do
so, and he chose not to. Presumably, that is because he read
the Seventh Amendment's two clauses differently, because he
didn't read the Jury Trial Clause the way Charles Lee would in
1808, or the Supreme Court does today.

219. Maybe the problem lay with the messenger. A lawyer who had reason to
know claimed that the Court's opinion in La Vengeance had been poorly reported. See
GOEBEL, supra note 102, at 777 n.50. That may also have been true of Marshall's
opinion in The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte.
220. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 440, 457-58 (1847); CURRIE,
supra note 203, at 23, 24 n.150; 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
347-51 (1826). But see United States v. McGill, 4 U.S. 429-30 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806)
(Washington, J.) (instructing the jury that "the words of the constitution must be
taken to refer to the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of England .
.

221. Of course, the opposite is also true.
222. See the text accompanying notes 143-47, above.
223. Remarks, supra note 145, at 261.
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B. Nineteenth Century Revisionism: On Joseph Story
Thus far, I have shown that there is every reason to believe
that the people who wrote and ratified the Jury Trial Clause
didn't understand it to incorporate the right existing in the
British common-law courts in 1791, and that no one saw things
differently during the rest of the eighteenth century. In fact,
the first identifiable advocate of anything resembling the modem interpretation of the Clause was a losing litigant before the
Supreme Court in 1808.' How, then, did that view get to be
the revealed Truth?
The received wisdom is that Joseph Story is responsible for
this transformation. According to one account, his 1812 circuit
court decision in United States v. Wonson'
turned the
tide. 6 Another version 7 credits the opinion he wrote in
1830 for the Supreme Court in Parsons v. Bedford."' On closer inspection, however, it turns out that neither opinion actually advocated the modern interpretation of the Jury Trial
Clause. In fact, I haven't found evidence that any lawyer or
judge did so before Story's death in 1845,229 when my search
ends.
Wonson was a debt case brought by the government to collect
a penalty for violation of one of the federal embargo laws." °
After losing a jury trial in the federal district court in Massachusetts, the United States appealed."3 Unsuccessfully.
224. Lee's position wasn't identical to the modern Court's. He described a static
right, while the Court also extends it to cases analogous to those which could be
tried to a common-law jury in England in 1791. See supra text accompanying note 7.
But the question wasn't raised by the facts of La Vengeance, so Lee hadn't necessarily considered and rejected today's variant of his doctrine.
225. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
226. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); 9
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
2302 n.4 (2d. ed. 1995); Klein, supra note 8, at 1020-23; Schwartz, supra note 8, at
600-01, 619; Wolfram, supra note 8, at 640-41.
227. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 196, at 168, 170-71; Redish, supra note 8, at 490,
519-20.
228. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
229. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 380-81
(1985).
230. See Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745.
231. See id. at 745, 747.
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Justice Story's son gave us the inside story of this decision:
Upon first coming to the Bench, my father found the

docket in his Circuits overloaded with penal actions and
cases of seizure arising under the embargo and non-intercourse systems, which had been suffered to accumulate in
consequence of the age and infirmity of his predecessor in
office, Mr. Justice Cushing. From a similar reason, a great
number of Common Law cases had been brought up to the
Circuit Court on appeal from the District Court. The docket
was almost appalling at first. It had been the former practice of the Circuit Court, following that of the State Courts,
to permit appeals from the District to the Circuit Court in
jury cases at Common Law; but immediately upon my
father's assuming his judicial functions, he delivered the
elaborate judgment of United States v. Wonson, in which he
held that no appeal lay from the District to the Circuit
Court in other than civil causes within the Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction, and that when a cause had been
once tried by a jury in the lower Court, it could not be
brought up on appeal, to be tried by another jury in the
superior Court [as was the practice in the State Courts] but
could come up only by writ of error on some grounds of law.
By this decision, in which the District-Attorney acquiesced,
no less than one hundred and thirty cases were at one blow
struck from the docket."
Story's opinion in Wonson was, as his son said, "elaborate."
To begin with, the Justice argued that the 1803 statute authorizing "appeals" from the district courts applied only to admiralty and maritime cases. Civil cases at common law (including
debt cases) could only be brought to the appellate courts by
writ of error, which authorized review of legal questions
aloneY3 Not content to rest his decision on such narrow
grounds, however, Story went further. Even if the case was
properly before the court on appeal (rather than error), he proclaimed, the government lacked the right (which it would have
had in the state courts) to a jury trial de novo in the circuit
court. In the first place, no law appeared to have created such
a right. The 1803 law intended to authorize appellate jurisdic-

232. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 221 (William W. Story ed., 1851) (cita-

tion omitted).
233. See Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745-47.
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tion, not a second jury trial, and the Rules of Decision Act
didn't bind federal courts to follow the rules of practice (including the use of juries) in the state courts.' But if there
was any doubt about either law's meaning, Story added, it
should not be read to authorize this mode of proceeding, because it would then be unconstitutional."s
It is this final step in Story's reasoning that is relevant to
the present inquiry. Because I think this part of his analysis
has been misunderstood in recent years, I will set it out in full:
The constitution of the United States provides "that the
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to
law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as congress shall make." At the time when the constitution was submitted to the people for adoption, one of the
most powerful objections urged against it was, that in civil
causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury. And
that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, both as
to law and fact, would enable that court, with or without a
new jury, to re-examine the whole facts, which had been
settled by a previous jury. The advocates of the constitution
endeavored to remove the weight of this objection by showing, that it was within the authority of congress to provide
in all cases for the trial by jury; and that the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court as to facts, did not necessarily include a re-examination of the facts so settled by a
jury; and further, that it might be with the strictest propriety held, that when a writ of error is brought from an inferior to a superior tribunal, the latter had jurisdiction of the
fact as well as of the law, and this was all the constitution
intended. Whoever will read the commentary on the constitution, entitled "The Federalist," will learn how deeply the
subject at that time interested the several states of the
Union, and with what singular zeal and acuteness it was
discussed. I advert to this work with the more readiness,
because it is the acknowledged production of three eminent
statesmen, of whom one was afterwards elevated to the

234. See id. at 747-50. The latter point, which Story hammered home by referring
approvingly to another federal circuit court's decision that it was not bound to use an
advisory jury in equity cases in conformity with the forum state's practice,-see id. at
749-50 (citing lower court decision in Massie v. West, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (1810)),
obviously rejects The Bill of Rights' conformity-based interpretation of the Jury Trial
Clause.
235. See id. at 750.
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highest judicial office in the country, and to him the comments on the judicial department have been generally attributed. 2 The Federalist, No. 81, No. 83.
With this view of the defects of the constitution as to the
trial by jury, and of the apprehensions entertained of new
trials by the appellate courts, we shall be able to comprehend the scope and object of the amendment, which was
proposed, and almost immediately and unanimously adopted, as part of the constitution. It is in these words: "In
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved. And no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law." Beyond all question, the
common law here alluded to is not the common law of any
individual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the
common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound the
grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to
every person acquainted with the history of the law. Now,
according to the rules of the common law the facts once
tried by a jury are never re-examined, unless a new trial is
granted in the discretion of the court, before which the suit
is depending, for good cause shown; or unless the judgment
of such court is reversed by a superior tribunal, on a writ
of error, and a venire facias de novo is awarded. This is the
invariable usage settled by the decisions of ages. Upon a
writ of error, the appellate court can examine in general
errors of law only, and never can re-try the issues already
settled by a jury, where the judgment of the inferior court
is affirmed.
According to the obvious intention of the amendment, the
legislature then could have no authority to give an appellate jurisdiction, the power to re-examine by a jury the
former decision of another jury, while the judgment below
stood unreversed....
On the whole, on this last point I am clearly of opinion,
that an appeal in a common law suit from the district court
removes errors of law only for the consideration of this
court; and that we are bound to deny a new trial of the
facts by a new jury."

236. Id. (emphasis added).
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This discussion clearly declared that the retrial of Wonson's
case would violate the Reexamination Clause, and that this
clause incorporated the reexamination rules of the English
common-law courts. In other important respects, however, it is
ambiguous. Why, for example, did Story restrict his stated
holding to "an appeal in a common law suit?" And why did he
review the background and quote the text of the Jury Trial
Clause? Finally, and (for present purposes) most significantly,
what was the referent of the word "here" in the italicized passage above?
I believe that the key to answering the first two questions
lies in Story's account of the ratification controversy. As Story
told it, the Antifederalists raised a single civil jury-related objection to the Constitution: it failed to protect the right to trial
by jury in civil cases, both by not affirmatively guaranteeing
the availability of jury trials and by permitting appellate reexamination of the facts found by any juries the states or the new
government might (in its generosity) permit civil litigants to
use. The Seventh Amendment answered the Antifederalists'
objection, he suggested, by protecting this right in both ways
they had requested. But only with respect to one class of cases,
"Suits at common law." This history therefore established that
the decision in this case could apply only to appeals in those
actions.
It is widely believed that the sentence I have italicized in the
second excerpted paragraph above was meant to define "Suits
at common law" as well as "the rules of the common law" referred to in the Reexamination Clause." From this perspective, Story was interpreting the Seventh Amendment as a static
provision, constitutionalizing both the right to jury trial as it
existed in the English common law courts at some unspecified
time and their ancient protective reexamination rules.
If this theory is correct, Story's opinion is rather strange. For
one thing, no one seems to have denied that this was a common-law case. For another, Story's opinion only discussed the
application of this interpretation of "the common law" to the
Reexamination Clause. Third, whether or not it would have

237. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 8, at 600.
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been "obvious to every person acquainted with the history of
the law"' that "the common law" meant England's, it would
have been anything but obvious to "anyone acquainted with"
The FederalistNo. 83 and the text of the Jury Trial Clause (not
to mention Aristogiton's essay or the decisions in La Vengeance
and its progeny) that "Suits at common law" incorporated the
English common-law right to jury trial. (In fact, if Story's son's
history was correct, 9 wouldn't "anyone acquainted with" the
seemingly established appellate practice in Justice Cushing's
court have thought it "obvious" that these jury trials de novo
were constitutional? Didn't the United States Attorney think
so?)
Three other facts appear to confirm my suspicion that "the
common law alluded to" referred exclusively to the text of the
Reexamination Clause. First, that clause speaks of "the common
law," while the Jury Trial Clause does not. Second, although
Joseph Story was a widely respected Justice, Wonson wasn't
cited as an interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause in any reported decision rendered during his lifetime, not even by him.
Third, eighteen years later, when Story explicitly wrote about
the original meaning of the Jury Trial Clause, he said something different.
The failure of later cases to cite Wonson on the meaning of
the Jury Trial Clause can't be attributed to a lack of opportunities. Story served on the Court until his death in 1845,'o and
judges and lawyers had plenty of chances to cite Wonson before
then. Consider Mayer v. Foulkrod,41 an equity case in which
the plaintiff sought discovery and an accounting to recover a
legacy. The defendant demurred, alleging that because
Pennsylvania's law courts made a "full, adequate, and complete
remedy at law" available to the plaintiff, there could be no
238. 28 F. Cas. at 750.
239. Kent Newmyer's outstanding study credits the notion that Cushing allowed
appellate jury trials de novo in common-law cases. See NEWMYER, supra note 229, at
99-100. (This is the other example of Cushing's generous attitude towards jury trials,
which was alluded to in note 113, above.) On the other hand, the last line of Story's
opinion in Wonson remarks, "no instance has ever occurred, in which a new trial by
the jury has been allowed in the appellate court." Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750-51. But
this may have been a reference only to the practice of other circuits. See id.
240. See NBWIYER, supra note 229, at 381.
241. 16 F. Cas. 1231 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9,341).

466

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:407

federal equity jurisdiction over the case. 2 The plaintiffs lawyers responded by citing a number of cases, including
Wonson.2 " Speaking through Bushrod Washington, the court
overruled the demurrer. Initially, he denied that Pennsylvania's
After relegal remedy was "full, complete and adequate."'
in
federal
remedy
such
a
of
the
availability
marking that only
court would deprive a federal court of equity jurisdiction, Washington rejected the defense claim that the Rules of Decision Act
bound federal courts to provide the same remedies available in
the forum state's courts, and he cited Wonson as "correctly
stat[ing]" the law on that question. 5 The governing federal
law, he maintained, was the Process Act of 1792. In the absence of court rules or judicial modification, he continued, that
law "prescribed a rule, by which the line of partition between
the law and the equity jui-sdiction of [federal] courts is distinctly marked." 6 Under this rule,
[t]he only inquiry... must be, what are the principles,
usages, and rules of courts of equity, as distinguished from
courts of common law, and (to borrow the expressions of the
supreme court in the case of Robinson v. Campbell), "defined in that country, from which we derive our knowledge
of those principles." The case just referred to, is indeed an
authority which so completely covers the present subject of
inquiry, as to render the further investigation of it superfluous, and we shall merely add to that authority, the decision of the supreme court in the case of U.S. v. Howland;
which is conclusive, not only of this particular point, but of
the question respecting the general jurisdiction of a court of
equity, in a case where there is a remedy at law, though
complete as that which a court of equity can ofnot as
7
fer.2

242. Id. at 1232.
243. See id. at 1233.
244. Id. at 1234.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1235.
247. Id. (citations omitted). It might be objected that Wonson was a distinguishable, constitutional, decision. But I wouldn't find this a satisfactory explanation for
Washington's failure to mention it. First, Wonson itself shows that judges didn't automatically shy away from the resolution of constitutional issues at that time. Second,
Washington could have cited Wonson as a decision on an important question lurking
in the background, even if he thought it unnecessary to resolve that question to decide this case. Third, it isn't clear to me how Washington could have believed his
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Four years earlier, in Harrison v. Rowan,"4 Justice Washington had considered a comparable question, and cited no authority whatsoever in support of his conclusion. Harrison involved an equity bill brought by a trustee and beneficiaries of a
testamentary trust who claimed that some of the decedent's
land should have passed under the trust. 9 They sought possession and the muniments of title from a legal heir and her
spouse, the administrator of the decedent's estate, who was also
in possession of the land. The defendants objected to the exercise of equity jurisdiction, arguing that ejectment would provide
an adequate legal remedy." ° Before presenting the precise
reasons that led him to reject this plea, Washington delivered a
general address to the bar about the meaning of section 16 of
the Judiciary Act:
[t]he expressions used in that section, "plain, adequate and
complete,"... go no farther than to recognize and adopt
the long and well established principles of the English court
of chancery, upon the subject of the ordinary jurisdiction of
a court of equity. Any other construction would unsettle
those great land marks which have hitherto separated the
two jurisdictions of the common law and equity courts; and
would introduce all that uncertainty which is usually attendant upon every new system.... [T]here are a number of
cases in which a concurrent jurisdiction is exercised by the
two courts; and in many of them, the ground of the equity
jurisdiction is not that the common law courts are incompetent to afford a remedy, but that such a remedy is less
complete than the court of equity, from the nature of its
organization, is capable of affording.... We hold it, therefore, to be perfectly clear, that where a case is otherwise
proper for the jurisdiction of a court of equity, it is no objection to its exercise that the party may have a remedy at
law. On the other hand, we do not mean to lay it down
that the mere circumstance that a more complete remedy
can be afforded in the former, than in the latter courts, is
of itself a ground of jurisdiction. The inquiry must always
description of Robinson to be accurate had he understood Wonson to have raised the
point to a constitutional level.
248. 11 F. Cas. 666 (C.C.D.N.J. 1819) (No. 6,143).
249. Id. at 666-67.
250. See id.
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be, whether the case is within any of the general branches
of equity jurisdiction, as claimed and exercised by that
court. The court has deemed it proper to make these general observations upon the equity jurisdiction of this court;
not because the case under consideration rendered them
necessary, but to correct what we consider to be an erroneous construction of the act of congress, referred to on this
subject." 1
Of course, it is possible that Washington's refusal to cite
Wonson in these cases was due to an unwillingness to broach
constitutional questions unnecessarily, 2 or to his uncertainty
about (or disagreement with) the constitutional analysis that
Story is said to have expounded in that case. And the same
could be said for the Supreme Court's failure to cite Wonson in
other "statutory interpretation" cases like Robinson and
Howland. But these considerations wouldn't explain why none
of the lawyers in any of these cases is reported to have cited
Wonson in support of a "backup" argument that the relevant
federal statutes "had to" be interpreted in a particular way, lest
they be unconstitutional. In fact, the arguments of counsel included in the published reports of federal decisions do not indicate that any lawyer ever cited it as an interpretation of the
Jury Trial Clause, not even when they were arguing the meaning of that Clause before the Court on which Justice Story sat!'n

251. Id. at 667-68. For my view on the original meaning of section 16, see the text
accompanying notes 187-203, above.
252. But see supra note 247.
253. I have found two possible exceptions to this rule. The first, Mayer, is discussed in the text accompanying notes 241-47, above. The reporter's notes don't tell
us for precisely what proposition counsel cited Wonson in that case, but I assume
that it was invoked for its remarks about the Rules of Decision Act, because that is
the context in which Justice Washington referred to it.
The other, Eaken v. United States, 8 F. Cas. 232, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No.
4,235), is a suit by the Government against a former employee whom it claimed owed
it money. The defendant moved to submit the accounts to referees, as was authorized
under a New York law he asserted to apply by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act
and the rules of the district court. The report notes that Wonson was one of the
cases he cited. It also states that "[tihe counsel for the United States read the seventh article of the amendments of the constitution of the United States, and cited"
four cases, the first being McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 344 (1819),
and the second Wonson. Id. Judge Van Ness is not reported to have cited any cases,
but he granted the motion on the authority of the Act. Under the circumstances, I
suspect that the aspect of Wonson being discussed here (as in Mayer) was its analysis
of the Rules of Decision Act.
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I am referring, of course, to Parsons v. Bedford.' Plaintiffs
brought this suit in the Louisiana courts to recover for tobacco
sold to defendants but not paid forY5 Since the parties were
citizens of different states, defendants were able to remove the
case to federal court."6 A federal law passed in 1824 required
that court in civil cases to conform to the modes of practice
followed in Louisiana's courts, unless it had made contrary
rules (and there was no evidence that it had)."7 Louisiana's
courts were heavily influenced by the civil law, and their procedures were unique." They used neither the common law
forms of process and pleading nor those of chancery, but novel
forms somewhat closer to the latter. The categories law and
equity did not exist, but jury trial was available on demand in
any case. However, either party could require that the jury be
limited to returning a special verdict. In addition, whether
litigants opted for a bench trial, a special verdict, or a general
verdict, either party could insist that the testimony be made
part of the record, which would allow a superior court to reexamine the facts in the event of an appeal. 9
The plaintiff won a favorable judgment, and the defendant
filed a writ of error in the Supreme Court, complaining that the
Court should order a new trial because the lower court had
refused to put the testimony on the record, as required under
Louisiana practice and the federal conformity law. ° The
Court affirmed the judgment below, ruling that any error in
this regard was harmless. Speaking through Justice Story, it
decided that the federal conformity statute should not be read
"to alter the appellate jurisdiction of this court, and to confer
on it the power of granting a new trial, by a re-examination of
the facts tried by the jury."26 ' As in Wonson, one reason Story
gave for so interpreting this law was that a contrary construc254. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
255. See id. at 434-35.
256. See id. at 441.
257. See id. at 44445.
258. On the state court procedures mentioned in the text, see id. at 450-51
(McLean, J., dissenting).
259. Although Justice McLean wrote that this procedure could be employed when
the parties obtained a special verdict, see id. at 451, Justice Story disagreed, see id.
at 443.
260. See id. at 441-42.
261. Id. at 448.
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tion would call in question its constitutionality. And once again,
the provision that this law threatened to violate was the Reexamination Clause. Story's constitutional analysis was as follows:
The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It
has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude,
and every encroachment upon it has been watched with
great jealousy. The right to such a trial is, it is believed,
incorporated into, and secured in every state constitution in
the union; and it is found in the constitution of Louisiana.
One of the strongest objections originally taken against the
constitution of the United States, was the want of an express provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil
cases. As soon as the constitution was adopted, this right
was secured by the seventh amendment of the constitution
proposed by congress; and which received an assent of the
people so general, as to establish its importance as a fundamental guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people.
This amendment declares, that "in suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact
once tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examinable in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." At this time there were no states in the
union, the basis of whose jurisprudence was not essentially
that of the common law in its widest meaning; and probably no states were contemplated, in which it would not
exist. The phrase "common law," found in this clause, is
used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and
maritime jurisprudence. The constitution had declared, in
the third article, "that the judicial power shall extend to all
cases inlaw and equity arising under this constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall
and to all cases of
be made under their authority," .
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. It is well known, that
in civil causes, in courts of equity and admiralty, juries do
not intervene, and that courts of equity use the trial by
jury only in extraordinary cases to inform the conscience of
the court. When, therefore, we find that the amendment
requires that the right of trial by jury shall be preserved in
suits at common law, the natural conclusion is, that this
distinction was present to the minds of the framers of the
amendment. By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in the third article "law;" not merely
suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to
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be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered; or where, as in the admiralty,
a mixture of public law, and of maritime law and equity
was often found in the same suit. Probably there were few,
if any, states in the union, in which some new legal remedies differing from the old common law forms were not in
use; but in which, however, the trial by jury intervened,
and the general regulations in other respects were according
to the course of the common law. Proceedings in cases of
partition, and of foreign and domestic attachment, might be
cited as examples variously adopted and modified. In a just
sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may
assume to settle legal rights. And congress seems to have
acted with reference to this exposition in the judiciary act
of 1789, ch. 20, (which was contemporaneous with the proposal of this amendment); for in the ninth section it is
provided, that "the trial of issues in fact in the district
courts in all causes, except civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury;" and in the twelfth
section it is provided, that "the trial of issues in fact in the
circuit courts shall in all suits, except these of equity, and
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, be by jury;" and
again, in the thirteenth section, it is provided, that "the
trial of issues in fact in the supreme court in all actions at
law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury."
But the other clause of the amendment is still more
important; and we read it as a substantial and independent
clause. "No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexaminable, in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." This is a prohibition
to the courts of the United States to re-examine any facts
tried by a jury in any other manner. The only modes known
to the common law to re-examine such facts, are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried,
or to which the record was properly returnable; or the
award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for
some error of law which intervened in the proceedings. The
judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 17, has given to all the
courts of the United States "power to grant new trials in
cases where there has been a trial by jury, for reasons for
which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of
law." And the appellate jurisdiction has also been amply
given by the same act (sec. 22, 24) to this court, to redress
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errors of law; and for such errors to award a262 new trial, in
suits at law which have been tried by a jury.
In a number of respects, this discussion bears a striking
resemblance to its counterpart in Wonson. As in 1812, Story
brought up the Jury Trial Clause in a case involving a possible
violation of the Reexamination Clause. And then there's the fact
that neither of these paragraphs, like their predecessors, says
one word about the facts of the case at bar. What was Justice
Story up to?
I believe that the answers to these questions lie in the arguments of defense counsel and the dissenting Justice McLean.
They posited that the Reexamination Clause, like the Jury
Trial Clause, extended only to common-law cases. Therefore, its
prohibition would have no application to this case unless this
case 3was a "Suit at common law," which they thought it was
26

not.

Justice Story's lengthy disquisition on the meaning of "Suits
at common law" thus went to the heart of this controversy. But
Story never acknowledged that. He never even said why he was
talking about the Jury Trial Clause or why this case was a
"Suit at common law."
In part, I suspect, this was because Story was merely playing
defense. Because he agreed with McLean and the defense lawyers that the Reexamination Clause only limited review of facts
found by juries in common-law cases, Story saw no need to
address the point. Story disagreed with their claim that this
was a federal civil case outside the courts' common law, equity,
or admiralty/maritime jurisdiction-he thought it a non-sequitur-,so he spoke to that issue. Given their concession that this
case wasn't an action in equity or admiralty/maritime law,
however, it was unnecessary for Story to prove it was an action
at law, the residuary class of federal cases, so he didn't.2 4

262. Id. at 446-48.
263. See id. at 437-39, 446-48 (arguments of Messrs. Livingston and Webster for
plaintiff in error); id. at 454-58 (McLean, J., dissenting).
264. This theory may also explain Story's similar omissions in Wonson, where it
was conceded that the case was a "Suit at common law" and perhaps (the arguments
of counsel aren't reported) no one denied that the Reexamination Clause only limited
judicial reexamination of jury factfinding in those cases.
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That may not, however, be the whole story. If any action to
determine a legal right is a "Suit at common law," Justice
McLean asked late in his opinion, what did this decision imply
for the Louisiana land titles that had been confirmed by Congress based upon the decisions of commissioners authorized by
it to determine (without a jury) which competing claimants had
good claims?2" Once again, Justice Story didn't reply. This
time, perhaps, he wanted to steer clear of controversy. If so,
maybe this desire strengthened his resolve to say nothing about
why the case before the Court was a "Suit at common law."
But if Parsons resembled Wonson stylistically, it was a dramatic departure from Wonson's constitutional doctrine, as that
doctrine is commonly understood. Wonson, you will recall, 6 is
widely thought to have enunciated a "unified field theory" of
the Seventh Amendment, in which both clauses were read to
have mummified English common-law rules concerning the
right to jury trial in civil cases. Parsons abandoned that vision,
if Story had ever truly held it. While Parsons continued to
maintain that the Reexamination Clause had permanently embedded the traditional English common-law reexamination rules
into federal law, and nothing more, Story now articulated a
view of the Jury Trial Clause that was far more dynamic.
There were, of course, fixed points in this new constitutional
firmament, including the division of all federal civil jurisdiction
(like Gaul) into three parts and the irrevocable assignment of
the old common law writs to the "common law" class. Yet Story
made it clear that this class could grow over time. Thus, he
proclaimed, the Clause's protection also extended to new causes
of action (even those yet to be created) in which legal rights
were to be settled.
The potential scope of the class of cases denominated "Suits
at common law" was unclear. On the one hand, Story failed to
explain how courts should distinguish "legal" from "equitable"
rights, which is to say "Suits at common law" and "equity,"
once the easy cases were left behind. Thus, cases brought under
the old common-law writs were simple: although they meant to
do more, the Creators did mean to "preserve" the right to jury

265. See Parsons, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 457-58 (McLean, J., dissenting).
266. See supra text accompanying note 237.
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trial in "suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings."26 7 New rights created by common-law
judges would ipso facto be just as plainly "legal," so the Jury
Trial Clause would apply in any case in which these rights
would be "ascertained and determined."2" The Creators, it
seems, were "preserving" the distinction between three heads of
jurisdiction, and the right to jury trial was an incident of "common-law" jurisdiction. But how would the "legal" or "equitable"
character of new, statutorily created, rights be ascertained? And
if a legislature created a new right and deemed it "legal," could
it later "equitize" that right and banish federal litigation about
it to juryless federal equity courts? Could it "equitize" a newly
minted "legal" right created by common-law judges? And if the
Congress authorized federal common-law courts to compel defendants to submit to discovery, declared that those courts
should regard a lack of consideration as a "legal" (rather than
an "equitable") defense to suits for breach of contract, or declared that "equitable" rights to specific performance of contracts would thenceforth be deemed "legal" and remediable on
the common-law side of the federal courts, would the traditional
equity jurisdiction of the English Chancery have been ousted?
Or did the Constitution also "preserve" the scope of English
equity jurisdiction as it stood on the undisclosed magic date?
Justice Story's opinion answered none of these questions. 9
Nor did it specify how the limits of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, as opposed to the content of the law to be applied
therein, were to be determined for the purposes of the Jury
Trial Clause.
These omissions left the door open to several different theories of the Jury Trial Clause. It could have led to an understanding that the Clause did nothing more than guarantee a
jury trial for the determination of an historically fixed set of
rights. Alternatively, it could have heralded a vision in which
the Clause further limited the scope of legislative discretion and
267. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
268. Id.
269. Contrary to the impression one might get from the scholarly literature, see,
e.g., Wolfram, supra note 8, at 642, 734 & n.284, the identity of this date was discussed in contemporary judicial opinions, and see, e.g., Bains v. The James & Catherine, 2 F. Cas. 410, 418 (C.C.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 765) (Baldwin, J.) (noting two different
views). Also see note 218 and accompanying text, above.
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extended the right to some wider group of cases. Finally, if the
reach of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction could increase over time, the Clause could have been thought not even
to have ensured the availability of a jury trial in every case in
which one of the historically fixed set of rights could have been
so determined in the English courts on the. unspecified magic
date. In other words, while this opinion may have opened the
door for modern Jury Trial Clause doctrine, Parsons neither
adopted nor required it.
Whatever its precise scope, the interpretation of the Jury
Trial Clause that Justice Story propounded in Parsons, which
he claimed to reflect the original understanding of its Creators,
was pure ipse dixit. Worse yet, it seems clearly to have been
wrong.
Let's start with his assertion that "Suits at common law" was
intended to be the equivalent of the civil side of Article III's
"Cases... in Law.""'0 Story's "argument" in support of this
theory is purely textual: the Jury Trial Clause speaks of
"'common law,'... in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence;""' Article III speaks of law,
equity, and admiralty/maritime jurisdiction; therefore, "common
law" must mean "law." To begin with, this suggestion is intuitively problematic. If the Creators of the Seventh Amendment
had wanted the scope of their guarantee to be coextensive with
the Constitution's civil "Cases ... in Law," why didn't their
Amendment say "civil Suits at Law," a formulation that no one
even proposed? Moreover, this construction seems inadmissible
by Story's own canons of interpretation. Sensibly enough, he
suggested that the Judiciary Act of 1789 could be used to test
his theory. But a more thorough examination of that Act reveals its inconsistency with his position. Section 13, which Story cited, vested the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction

270. In an essay first published in 1800 and then reissued as part of his edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries, St. George Tucker opined that "Cases . . . in Law" included criminal as well as civil cases. See St. George Tucker, Of the Unwritten, or Common Law of England, and its Introduction Into, and Authority Within the United
States, reprinted in 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 418-21 app. (Augustus M. Kelley
pub. 1969) (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) [hereinafter Tucker, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
271. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
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[over] all controversies of a civil nature, where a State is a
party except between a State and its Citizens[,].
all
such suits or proceedings against Ambassadors, or other
public Ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as
a Court of law can have or exercise consistently with the
law of Nations[,] ... [and] of all suits brought by Ambassadors, or other public Ministers, or in which a Consul or
Vice-Consul shall be a party. 2
It then continued, in language partly quoted in Story's opinion,
"And the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme Court, in all
actions at law against Citizens of the United States, shall be by
Jury."' 3 This last sentence clearly implies that Congress believed it was giving the Court original jurisdiction over some
"actions at law" (and why didn't it call them "suits at common
law"?) that were not "against Citizens of the United States," or
that qualifying phrase would have been superfluous. Yet the
Act did not extend the right to jury trial to those cases, so they
must not have been regarded as "Suits at common law." This
confirms my belief that, contrary to Story's assertion, the First
Congress didn't consider the Seventh Amendment to guarantee
a right to jury trial in all civil "Cases . . . in Law." 4
However, Story's assertion that the Creators meant by "Suits
at common law" to incorporate the English common-law right
"plus" was even more indefensible. In the interest of accuracy, I
guess I should go back a step. Story never actually said this.
He said that the Creators meant "Suits at common law" to
signify "Law," and then he fabricated a definition of the term
they didn't use to define the one they did.
Now why would anybody do such a strange thing? Why not
consider the evidence available to show what the Creators
thought about the language they did use? For example, why not
consider The Federalist No. 83, which Story had cited in

272. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81 (1789).
273. Id., 1 Stat. at 81.
274. This congressional understanding may also help explain why section 9 of the
Judiciary Act avoided the term "Suits at common law" in giving district courts jurisdiction over suits against consuls or vice consuls and tort suits brought by aliens
under international law or American treaties. Could it be that some of the cases
referred to in section 13 were not "Suits at common law" but "suits under international law?" See Tucker, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 270, app. at 420.
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Wonson? Can it be a coincidence that this essay isn't mentioned
here? That Wonson isn't?
Further, why didn't Story mention the way previous judges
had interpreted this clause? Had John Marshall forgotten about
The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte? Was Story missing that volume of Cranch's Reports? In Wonson, he had invoked the results of his own informal survey of the practice in other circuits
to show that there was no precedent for allowing appellate jury
trials in the federal courts. 5 Had none of the other sitting
judges ever expressed an opinion on this issue on circuit? Had
none of their predecessors?
There's something else that bothers me about this opinion. As
I have already observed, Story's decision rejected a "unified
field theory" of the Seventh Amendment, endorsing a fairly
dynamic interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause and a completely static interpretation of the Reexamination Clause. Yet both
clauses spoke of "common law." How could they be interpreted
so differently?276 And if textual analysis mattered, why not
look to the Reexamination Clause for the meaning of the Jury
Trial Clause, or at least explain why it wasn't advisable to do
so? Why did Story say nothing about any of this? 7
It has probably occurred to you by now that I don't think
Story was being serious about the idea that his decision was
based on, or justified by, the original understanding or the text
of the Jury Trial Clause. This point would be even clearer if,
contrary to my belief, Wonson was simply a first draft of Parsons. Wonson made a similar appeal to the original understanding of the Seventh Amendment, but consider what Story did in
that opinion. He cited The Federalist No. 83 (which he incorrectly attributed to John Jay) as evidence of the careful attention given to the civil jury trial issue during the ratification

275. See supra note 239.
276. This question has been asked before, but not answered. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1057 n.* (1953); CURRIE, supra note 203, at 112 n.141.
277. Note that, while Parsons construed "common law" in a paragraph on the Jury
Trial Clause, Wonson interpreted "the common law" in Wonson's discussion of the
Reexamination Clause. Was Story aware of the textual distinction and merely failing
to point out that it justified the different interpretations he placed on these two
clauses in these opinions?
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controversy and then forgot about it when he announced that it

was "obvious" that "the common law here alluded to" could only
have been the common law of England. What's more, if our account is to be trusted,25 after only three months on the job,

the thirty-two year old Justice claimed to have greater insight
into the original meaning of the Seventh Amendment than
William Cushing, who had been on the Supreme Court since
the beginning. 279 And he did so without having spent much
time at the elbow of John Marshall, armed with nothing but
his survey and the text of the Seventh Amendment (which he
inaccurately transcribed as two separate sentences). Clearly,
this decision was the work of a brash young reformer, 28 not a
serious historian or textualist. And Parsons was cut from the
same cloth.
Of course, even a brash young reformer can get it right now
and then. In fact, for the reasons I will explain below, I believe
that Story was right about the original understanding of the
Reexamination Clause. However, I am equally persuaded that
he was wrong about the Jury Trial Clause. Nothing in his opinion controverts any of the evidence discussed in the previous
section of this paper. Story simply ignored the Clause's text and
history in favor of a result he preferred. 1

278. See supra text accompanying notes 232, 238.
279. Story's birth date is reported in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 841 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). He took office on Feb.
3, 1812, see id. at 966, and decided Wonson that May, see Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745.
280. On the reforms Story introduced in the First Circuit in 1812, see NEWMYER,
supra note 229, at 99-100. On his early readiness to reform Supreme Court decisions
of which he disapproved, see, e.g., id. at 100-05.
281. Not to beat a dead horse, but it's hard to resist noting that Story also ignored the fact he and the Court had repeatedly intimated or decided that the federal
courts' admiralty/maritime jurisdiction was not limited by the limits of British admiralty, and continued to do so after Parsons had become law. See CURRIE, supra note
203, at 23-25, 117-19, 257-59, for broad and narrow interpretations of these decisions.
To the extent that this was so, Americans could be denied the right of jury trial in
cases in which Britons would have had such a right in 1791, contrary to one possible
version of Parsons' thesis.
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IV. MY "ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING" OF THE
JURY TRIAL CLAUSE

Now that I've said so much about what I don't think the
Jury Trial Clause originally meant, it's time to say a few words
about what I think its Creators had in mind. As a civil libertarian, I'm not particularly happy about what I'm going to say.
However, the theory I will elaborate best accommodates the
early evidence I have found, so I must accept it for now.
I believe that the Jury Trial Clause had both a number of
purposes, and a number of levels of meaning. At the most basic
level, it responded to the Antifederalists' charge that the new
Constitution had abolished or prohibited civil jury trials. In this
respect, it proclaimed, "There may be civil jury trials in our
courts!"

2

Beyond this, it was a statement of "general principle" of the
kind that George Mason had requested at the Philadelphia
In the spirit of the many precatory "declaraConvention.'
tions of rights" in the state constitutions, 8 it trumpeted,
"America still values its tradition of civil jury trials in the common-law courts!"
Of course, it was also a guarantee that there would be a
right to jury trial in "Suits at common law." But which cases
were those? I have argued above that this phrase did not mean
cases in which there would have been such a right in the state,
or the British, courts. Nor did it refer to equity or admiralty/maritime cases; but if (as I have indicated) the Constitution
didn't adopt the definitions of those categories set forth in the
state or British precedents, which cases were they?
The answer, I believe, is that the Seventh Amendment left
the determination of which civil cases would be regarded as

282. To this extent, I agree with Rachael Schwartz, see Schwartz, supra note 8, at
603-04, and with The Bill of Rights' intuition that the Jury Trial Clause is structural
in nature.
283. For Masons request, see supra text accompanying note 12.
284. The civil jury trial provision in Virginia's Declaration, which Mason wrote,
and which was the basis of Virginia's proposed amendment to the federal Constitution, was one such statement. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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"Suits at common law"-i.e., the extent of the right to jury trial
in civil cases in the federal courts--entirely to the discretion of
the Congress.' Thus, it gave Hamilton what he'd asked for,
just as it had Mason.' And satisfying both of those men was
no mean feat!
In fact, I believe that this was the principal object of the
Seventh Amendment, and that it was a complete success. In
that respect, I think it was exactly like the Sixth Amendment's
District Clause." ' The District Clause responded to the AntiFederalists' demand that local juries be used in criminal trials
by saying, "If we decide to give you local juries, you'll get local
juries." But the public accepted this provision because the Judiciary Act created district courts for Kentucky and Maine and
provided that juries in capital cases should generally at least
largely be drawn from the county where the crime occurred.'
285. I don't think the Creators intended the courts to give content to this indeterminate term, and here are a few of the reasons why. In the first place, although
numerous Federalists, including Hamilton, argued that Congress should be given this
authority, no one is known to have thought that it should be left in the hands of the
judiciary. Secondly, what we know about the Senate debates over section 16 of the
Judiciary Act, see supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text, doesn't suggest that
anyone thought that the line there drawn between law and equity would be subject
to constitutional second-guessing by the Supreme Court, and I presume that Senator
Maclay would certainly have made and recorded that point had it been deemed plausible. We know less about the discussion concerning section 9, but I find it equally
unlikely that Congress believed the Supreme Court could hold that section unconstitutional for overly expanding admiralty/maritime jurisdiction at the expense of the
right to jury trial. Third, while federal judges in the early cases, officially reported
and otherwise, often considered whether federal statutes allowed or required them to
forego a jury, there is no indication that anyone questioned the constitutionality of
these statutes insofar as they purported to justify proceeding in equity. This would be
odd if the courts, not the Congress, were the ultimate arbiter of the line between law
and equity. Finally, if I am right that Congress rejected the idea of
constitutionalizing British or state-based rights to jury trial, what standard would
anyone have expected the Court to use to distinguish "Suits at common law" from
others? I find it hard to believe that the Creators silently agreed to give the federal
courts plenary authority to undertake this essentially legislative task, subject only to
correction by constitutional amendment.
286. In a letter to Samuel Griffin dated September 8, 1789, Mason announced his
pleasure with the amendments that the House had passed, although noting, among
other things, that he still wished to see one "confining the federal Judiciary to Admiralty & Maritime Jurisdiction, and to Subjects merely federal." See Letter of George
Mason to Samuel Griffin (Sept. 8, 1789), reprinted in Veit, CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 292, 292.
287. The story of the District Clause is set forth in the text accompanying notes
69-79, above.
288. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2, 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789). On the suc-
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That is, the Act convinced the people that the Congress wouldn't act tyrannically, and the people were satisfied.
Similarly, I believe that the Jury Trial Clause meant that
federal civil litigants would be entitled to a jury trial whenever
the Congress deigned to allow them to have one. 89 But the
Judiciary Act so generously provided for civil jury trials that
Their
the people's fears were calmed on this score, too.'
paranoid fantasies about the new government's importation of
civil law (or worse) had been dispelled.
While this "original understanding" of the Jury Trial Clause
may not be attractive to civil libertarians, it best accommodates
the available evidence of what its Creators had in mind. Thus,
it makes sense of critical linguistic choices made during its
drafting and amendment. For example, it explains why Congress chose to describe the class of civil cases to which the
right of jury trial applied in indeterminate language, language
different from that used in the civil jury provisions of all of the
proposed amendments and all of the extant state constitutions.
It also explains why this term was not used in the Reexamination Clause. In fact, it provides a textual basis for Joseph
Story's intuition-which still lies at the heart of the law-that
the constitutional reexamination rules, unlike the set of civil
cases subject to the right of jury trial, are completely static.
And it sheds light on a third constitutional provision by suggesting a principled reason why the Creators apparently didn't
even consider a conformity-based solution to the Sixth Amendment vicinage problem.
This theory respects the text and spirit of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 and the several Process Acts, which so strongly betoken
plenary congressional authority to determine the scope of equity
jurisdiction (down to the cognizability at law of equitable defenses) in federal courts. That sense of freedom is nowhere

cess of this approach in pacifying the people, see supra note 76.
289. In those cases, the Seventh Amendment forbade federal judges to deny litigants what Congress has given them. This reflects the fact that the House Commit-

tee of Eleven changed Madison's precatory "ought to remain inviolate" to "shall be
preserved" See House Committee of Eleven Report, First Congress (July 28, 1789),
reprinted in Cogan, COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 495, 495.

290. It also didn't hurt that the Judiciary and Process Acts directed considerable
conformity with state process, practice, jury selection, and substantive law.
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more clearly expressed than in the legislative history of section
16 of the Judiciary Act. The Senate debates on this provision,
culminating in the enactment of a novel, indulgent, definition of
the boundary of the Chancellors' domain, show that there were
no sacred cows, and nothing in the Bill of Rights that the Senate would soon endorse seems to have given anyone second
thoughts about that question.
My analysis takes into account the fact that the ratifiers of
the Jury Trial Clause, even after reading the Judiciary and
Process Acts of 1789, would have had no way of knowing that
the Clause had some more determinate meaning. And it explains why all parties to the ratification-era debate about a civil
jury guarantee seem to have emerged happy with the outcome.
This theory can account for all of the reported cases mentioned above that were decided in the federal courts' early
years. It explains, for example, why there is so little evidence
that anyone other than Charles Lee suggested before Parsons
that the Seventh Amendment trumped a federal statute allowing an issue to be tried without a jury.29 1 It makes it clear
why cases like Robinson and Howland & Allen treated jury
trial questions as questions of pure statutory interpretation. At
the same time, the mysteries of two of the three unofficially
reported decisions quickly disappear if my analysis is correct:
Judge Law's dissent in Bache presents no problem because the
Reexamination Clause isn't conformity-based, and the Higginson
judges may have disagreed about the discretionary judgments
they were required to make under section 16 of the Judiciary
Act. (William Cushing's dissent in Hazzard is hard to explain,
period, but maybe the Justice who allowed appellate jury trials
was merely taking the position that he would insist on using
advisory juries in cases under section 26 of the Judiciary Act
where the sum due was "certain" if either party so wished.)
What's more, my interpretation of the Jury Trial Clause is
consistent with the judges' understanding of the limits of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

291. As far as I am aware, the only other case decided during this period in
which the report hints that such a claim may have been made is Eaken v. United
States, 8 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1822) (No. 4,235), which is discussed in note 253,
above.
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Finally, my argument coheres with the only eighteenth century exegeses of the Jury Trial Clause that I know of. It makes
sense of the Jeffersonians' failure to claim that the Clause
obliged federal courts to adopt their forum state's jury trial
rules. It justifies Aristogiton's acknowledgment that the Reexamination Clause adopted English law, as well as his judgment
that the Jury Trial Clause didn't. The Citizen and Aristogiton
may not have said the indeterminate "Suits at common law"
was to be given content by the Congress, but they didn't deny
it, either: given their party's growing distrust of the governing
Federalists, the notion that Congress had such power may well
have been too disturbing to mention.
In sum, the theory that the Jury Trial Clause gave Congress
plenary authority to determine the extent of the right to civil
jury trial in the federal courts comports with all of the early
historical evidence. No other explanation of the Jury Trial
Clause can make that claim. Until one of those conditions
changes, that theory should be considered the original understanding of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial."

292. Three final points. First, Kenneth Klein has written that the Clause wasn't
meant to distinguish cases involving judicially created rights from cases involving
statutory rights, but that it should be read as if it had. See Klein, supra note 6, at
1035, 1036 & n.146. I think it's clear that he was right the first time. Second, while
it might be attractive to argue that section 16 of the Judiciary Act reflected a tacit
understanding that the Clause was "preserving" the notion that, admiralty/maritime
cases aside, a right to trial by jury in civil cases could only be trumped by equity
(and then only if the traditional prerequisite for the exercise of equity jurisdiction
was satisfied), in light of the facts that no one ever seems to have suggested this
approach or thought it was our law, the freedom with which modifications of section
16 were enacted and revoked, and the fact that it did not, in the end, embody the
traditional "inadequacy" standard, see supra text accompanying notes 194-200, I find
this unlikely to have been the case. Even if I'm wrong, however, unless some incorporation notions were thrown into the mix, federal authorities would still have complete discretion to determine which actions and remedies were legal and when those
remedies were "inadequate." Finally, whereas The Bill of Rights argues that this
Clause was about federalism, I think it was about calming the Nation, standing up.
for mom and apple pie, and making it clear that Congress could and (under the
Judiciary Act) would give civil litigants a chance to obtain a fairer, or at least a
more satisfying, resolution of their (predominately) private disputes when that was
the sensible thing to do.

